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ABSTRACT 
  Much public commentary has asserted or implied that the 
American criminal-justice system unjustly privileges individuals who 
commit crimes in corporations and financial markets. This Article 
demonstrates that this claim is not accurate—at least not in the ways 
commonly believed. Law and practice of sentencing, evidence, and 
criminal procedure cannot persuasively be described as privileging the 
white collar offender. Substantive criminal law makes charges in 
white collar cases easier to bring and harder to defend against than in 
other cases. Enforcement institutions, and the political economy in 
which they exist, include features that both shelter corporate offenders 
and heighten their exposure to criminal liability. Corporate actors 
enjoy a large advantage in legal-defense resources relative to others. 
That advantage, however, does not pay off quite as one might expect. 
A fully developed claim of privilege can be sustained only by showing 
that basic American arrangements of criminal law and policing have 
been misguided. This argument would fault the justice system for 
failing to treat illegal behavior within firms as requiring omnipresent 
policing, looser definitions of criminality, the harshest of 
punishments, and rethinking of the right to counsel. Those who 
believe corporate offenders are privileged should confront the 
difficulties that argument entails. And they should be aware of the 
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complications that follow from overreliance on punishment to deal 
with intractable problems of ex ante regulatory control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A popular belief holds that the American criminal-justice system 
has been favoring those who commit crime in the corporate domain.1 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–4 
(2010) (statement of Sen. Kaufman); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET 
ALWAYS WINS 65–95 (2012); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE (2012), 
available at http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf; Charles 
Ferguson, Obama and Corporate Crime, CORP. CRIME REP., June 11, 2012, at 1, 12–14; 
Editorial, Going Soft on Corporate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A26; Joe Nocera, 
Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1; Joe Nocera, 
How To Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2012, at A19; 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall 
Street (CBS News television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=7390540n; Victoria Finkle, Are Some Banks “Too Big To Jail?,” AM. BANKER (Jan. 
22, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_15/are-some-banks-too-big-to-
jail-1056033-1.html?pg=4; Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables; Arianna Huffington, Send 
the Bastards to Jail!, SALON (July 16, 2002, 2:36 PM), http://www.salon.com/2002/07/16/
corporate_reform; Peter Schweizer, Obama’s DOJ and Wall Street: Too Big for Jail?, FORBES 
(May 7, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/07/obamas-doj-and-wall-
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This charge deserves attention. Harmful wrongs committed with the 
powers of large private institutions are pressing concerns for public 
policy. If law and legal institutions do not respond seriously to 
wrongdoing in business firms, they will fail to protect the public and 
may produce or harden inequities in the administration of justice. It is 
an important question whether American law and legal institutions 
shield the white collar offender without justification. 
This Article addresses that question in depth—as to the 
individual, not the firm—and finds two perspectives that produce 
opposing answers. If one broadly examines the contemporary 
criminal-justice machine as it is applied, day in and out, to the serious 
white collar offender, one cannot find systematic privilege. Rather, 
one can see a case for privilege only from a perspective that blames 
foundational arrangements of American criminal justice for having 
misconceived the phenomenon of white collar crime. This view would 
call for reordering basic punishment scales, renovating substantive 
criminal law, creating entirely new modes of policing in the business 
world, and rethinking rights to counsel. The conversation invited by 
this perspective is worth having. But recent discussions of this subject 
have been unproductive and misleading in suggesting that the issues 
are more superficial than is true. 
Consider the first perspective: in its operation, the present 
criminal-justice system routinely favors the corporate criminal. The 
overwhelming weight of academic opinion and a slowly broadening 
spectrum of public opinion have determined that America’s gigantic, 
exceptional system of arresting and incarcerating its people is at least 
itself broken, if not also opening dangerous social fissures.2 If one 
 
street-too-big-for-jail; Matt Taibbi, Jon Corzine Is the Original George Zimmerman, ROLLING 
STONE (Apr. 24, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/jon-
corzine-is-the-original-george-zimmerman-20120424; Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, 
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-
wall-street-in-jail-20110216 [hereinafter Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?]. 
 2. The literature is too voluminous to cite fully. For some of the major voices, see 
generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND 
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND 
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL 
ORDER (2011); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING 
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND 
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
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tunes one ear to claims about American corporate crime and the 
other to voices of alarm about the scale and severity of American 
criminal justice, the sound can be discordant. 
Both assertions—that criminal justice shields the business 
criminal while also producing an inhumane and costly “carceral 
state”—could be true only if there were some mechanism by which 
the power of the American system were diverted from throwing its 
full weight at the corporate violator. One would expect to find a place 
where the institutions and officials who administer law and criminal 
justice engaged in such deflective efforts, as well as reasons for them 
regularly to do so. 
Efforts to search for such mechanisms in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis have been limited to the press, where discussions 
have been more confusing than illuminating. For example, the New 
York Times editorial board scolded the U.S. Department of Justice 
(Justice Department) for declining to prosecute bankers responsible 
for practices that unleashed the 2008 financial crisis.3 The Times 
described the relevant conduct as “reckless lending, heedless 
securitizations, exorbitant paydays and illusory profits.”4 Without 
discussing a legal theory on which such conduct could support a 
federal prosecution, the Times speculated that the Justice 
Department’s supposed fecklessness resulted from the zeal of its 
political overseers to please the banking sector.5 Meanwhile, the New 
Yorker published a long exploration of President Obama’s soured 
relationship with leading bankers and other corporate chieftains, 
warning that his campaign’s poor record in cultivating wealthy 
contributors might cost the President reelection.6 All the while, the 
Wall Street Journal has steadily beaten a drum of alarm about a 
Justice Department it has described as out of control in its zealous 
pursuit of financiers and public officials.7 
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND 
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); and 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991). 
 3. Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at SR10. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Jane Mayer, Schmooze or Lose, NEW YORKER, Aug. 27, 2012, at 24. 
 7. See, e.g., Editorial, Abuse of Privilege, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2007, at A12; Editorial, 
Bear Market Victory, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at A24; Editorial, Black and Blue, WALL ST. 
J., July 16, 2007, at A12; Editorial, Brandon and Buffet Redux, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2011, at A14; 
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Clearer thinking is in order. It has been some time—perhaps 
going back to the work of the sociologist and legal scholar Stanton 
Wheeler and his colleagues at Yale in the 1980s, who took up the 
project begun by the sociologist Edwin Sutherland in the 1930s—
since the busy legal discussion of crime in corporations has taken a 
healthy step back to consider the overall position of the individual 
white collar offender in the United States. In the modern legal 
academy, the problem of white collar crime has been addressed 
mostly by arguing about how to define criminal wrongs and about 
whether and how to criminalize firms.8 There is need for 
comprehensive discussion of how procedure and institutions treat the 
white collar offender—specifically the individual who offends within 
the corporate and financial sectors that draw so much of the public’s 
attention today. 
To assert that the offender in the corporate world is privileged 
because of her class is conclusory. The important question is how that 
status might affect criminal-justice outcomes. Sutherland, the path-
breaking criminologist who invented the unfortunate but now 
inescapable term white collar crime, defined it as “a crime committed 
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation.”9 He really meant it. Sophisticated as his work was in its 
 
Editorial, Corporate Injustice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at A14; Editorial, Department of 
Injustice, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2012, at A14; Editorial, Dishonest Prosecutorial Services, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 27, 2010, at A18; Editorial, Enron Overstretch, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2005, at A16; 
Editorial, The KPMG Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2007, at A20; Editorial, White-Collar Justice, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2008, at A16. 
 8. For some of the most important works on conceptualizing white collar crime, see 
generally STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the 
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does 
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in 
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Dan 
M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618–22 
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); 
Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1997). 
 9. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949); see also DAVID WEISBURD, 
STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING & NANCY BODE, CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: 
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 5 (1991) (explaining that Sutherland 
was trying to bring attention to ignored criminality, so he moved among “casual” conceptions of 
white collar crime based in social status, occupation, and organizational context). For extended 
discussion of Sutherland’s influence in a series of essays by sociologists and criminologists, see 
generally WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 
1992). 
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time, Sutherland’s project was to accuse the management class of 
getting away with the business equivalent of murder.10 
The bare question of class is not the one pressing hardest at the 
moment on the legal system, at least not overtly.11 Today, lawyers 
more plausibly define white collar crime as a realm of substantive 
criminal offenses that share certain characteristics—in how they are 
committed, in the settings where they arise, and in the way statutes 
define them—and which are committed by a diversity of persons.12 
 
 10. See John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 2–3 (1985) (stating, in 
an admiring treatment, “Sutherland’s mission was to turn muckraking into sociology”). 
 11. Cf. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (“White-collar crime evokes images of rich 
and powerful Americans often immune from apprehension and prosecution in the criminal 
justice system, Americans who can use their power in ways that lead them to be rewarded rather 
than punished for their misdeeds.”); id. at 4 (“The idea that the advantaged, like the 
disadvantaged, may be prone to criminality, but that their crimes are of a different type, fit 
easily into the American tradition of reform.”). Survey research suggests that the public views 
forms of white collar crime as equally serious or more serious than forms of street or violent 
crime involving comparable degrees of harm. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen, Jennifer L. Hartman & 
Cheryl Lero Jonson, Bad Guys: Why the Public Supports Punishing White-Collar Offenders, 51 
CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 31, 39 (2009); Kristy Holtfreter, Shanna Van Slyke, Jason Bratton & 
Marc Gertz, Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50, 57 
(2008); Nicole Leeper Piquero, Stephanie Carmichael & Alex R. Piquero, Research Note, 
Assessing the Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar and Street Crimes, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 
291, 306 (2008). It is a serious question—though beyond the subject of this Article—whether 
social status enables or explains the tendency to violate the law, or at least certain kinds of laws. 
See Paul K. Piff, Daniel M. Stancato, Stéphane Côté, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton & Dacher 
Keltner, Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 4086, 4089 (2012) (summarizing the results of seven observational and experimental studies 
that yielded evidence that positive attitudes toward greed tend to make persons more likely to 
engage in and look favorably upon unethical behaviors, and that such attitudes are more 
prevalent among persons of higher social classes). 
 12. See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 62 (“[W]hite-collar criminals are generally much 
closer in background to average Americans than to those who occupy positions of great power 
and prestige.”). Weisburd and his coauthors’ observation is based on an empirical study of 1,094 
federal criminal prosecutions from 1976 to 1978 involving securities fraud, antitrust, bribery, 
bank embezzlement, mail and wire fraud, false claims and statements, credit and lending-
institution fraud, and tax fraud that demonstrated the prevalence of middle-class offenders and 
routine offenses. Id. at 9–11, 15, 45–46, 180, app. 1 tbl.A-1; see also HERBERT EDELHERTZ, 
NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND 
PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970) (defining white collar crime as “an illegal act 
or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain 
money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage” (emphasis omitted)); Stuart P. 
Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 
32–33 (2004) (suggesting that white collar crime be defined as a category of offenses bearing a 
family resemblance because they involve certain forms of diffuse and aggregate harm, certain 
forms of moral wrongfulness, and a distinctive role for mens rea). See generally Gilbert Geis, 
White Collar Crime: What Is It?, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED, supra note 9, at 31 
(summarizing the academic debate about definitions of white collar crime in the period from the 
1940s to the 1990s). 
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One can hardly overstate how much the practice of prosecuting crime 
in the milieu of the business firm (termed here “corporate crime”) 
has mushroomed since the late 1980s.13 And today’s management 
class, though far from a model of diversity, is open to newcomers in 
ways that would have been unrecognizable in Sutherland’s day.14 
The bulk of this Article is devoted to showing that study of the 
routine operation of criminal-justice institutions belies the claim that 
the American system unjustly shields individual corporate offenders, 
that is, persons who commit financial crimes in business firms.15 
Privilege cannot be found in sentencing law and practice, which 
nowadays treat the corporate offender with genuine harshness. Nor in 
substantive law, which turns out to be more problematic for the 
financial criminal than for many other offenders. Nor in the laws of 
evidence and procedure, which do not produce an identifiable 
advantage in case outcomes for the white collar defendant. Nor in 
contemporary enforcement regimes, which—though they direct fewer 
conventional policing resources to the corporate sector—have 
structural features that heighten the exposure of business actors to 
criminal sanctions. Clear privilege can be found in access to well-
 
 13. For empirical examination of the contemporary scope of corporate criminal 
prosecutions and defense practice, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) (discussing the rise in federal prosecution of 
organizations); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of 
Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221 (2011) 
(discussing the growth of white collar practice in law firms and the demographics of 
practitioners in these firms). 
 14. See, e.g., ANITA RAGHAVAN, THE BILLIONAIRE’S APPRENTICE: THE RISE OF THE 
INDIAN-AMERICAN ELITE AND THE FALL OF THE GALLEON HEDGE FUND (2013). 
 15. There is no claim here with regard to firms. Many public discussions of these issues 
have engaged in a category mistake by mixing arguments about the prosecution of individuals 
with arguments about the prosecution of firms. See generally, e.g., Finkle, supra note 1; 
Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1. The two regulatory and public policy issues have 
important connections but yield quite different analyses. Compare Jennifer Arlen & Reineer 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (using economic analysis to assess the optimal legal structures for 
imposing liability on firms to deter individual law violations), and Samuel W. Buell, The 
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006) [hereinafter Buell, The 
Blaming Function] (discussing the social meaning of imposing liability on firms and its 
potentially beneficial message effects), with Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the 
Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007) [hereinafter Buell, Criminal Procedure] (examining how 
rules of criminal procedure and evidence apply when individuals are prosecuted within the 
context of business firms), and Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 
(2006) [hereinafter Buell, Novel Fraud] (discussing how theories and doctrine of criminal fraud 
should be understood, as applied to individuals in contemporary business cases). These sources 
also cite helpful background literature. 
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funded counsel. But there, the advantage is not as decisive as 
generally believed. 
The secondary objective is to argue that, in light of this Article’s 
primary analysis, those who would cast the corporate offender as 
privileged must question foundational features of American law and 
legal systems that mainstream academic discussion usually treats as 
sacrosanct. Given the increasing severity of sentencing laws governing 
financial crime over the last twenty years, these critics would need to 
argue for such things as routine imposition of maximal terms of 
imprisonment for nonviolent crimes. The argument would also need 
to consider abandoning Anglo-American principles of substantive 
criminal law holding that serious property crimes, as well as theories 
of accomplice and conspiratorial liability, require purposeful states of 
mind; discarding constitutional and other commitments to laws of 
evidence and procedure that are trans-substantive; reordering the 
relationship between the state and firms to include surveillance and 
policing practices that have not existed in markets other than those 
subject to complete prohibition; and altering basic rights, including 
constitutional rights, to private and public funding of lawyers. 
Perhaps economic and social circumstances have reached a point 
at which radical change is required in white collar justice. If so, critics 
of the treatment of corporate offenders might do well to take up such 
an argument. But advocates of such positions need appreciate not just 
the ambitions of their agenda but also its possible consequences. A 
desire to compel the criminal-justice system to consume a wider swath 
of business cases might be a “nothing else works” resort to 
criminalization, propelled by painfully understandable exasperation 
with repeated failures of ex ante regulatory control in financial 
markets. If so, the argument would turn out to stretch conventional 
theories of crime. And it would be liable to criticisms that have been 
leveled at reliance on criminalization to deal with, for example, 
America’s addiction epidemic or its problem of immigration control. 
Three prefatory points before proceeding with the argument. 
First, the lion’s share of recent discussion about white collar crime has 
concerned the corporate offender—the law violator who is employed 
by the sizable business firm (incorporated or not), which serves as the 
site of conduct that is said to warrant legal sanction. Many white 
collar offenses, maybe even most of them, are committed by 
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pedestrian hucksters, scam artists, cheaters, and liars.16 Such persons 
have been among us for ages. This Article makes few claims about 
the treatment of this class of offenders—the home buyer who lies to 
obtain a mortgage, the taxpayer who cheats the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), the restaurant manager who bribes the health 
inspector, and their ilk. 
The discussion here responds to a public debate that does not 
often mention the small-time crook. Citizens of the early twenty-first 
century keenly appreciate how large private institutions and markets 
influence so many aspects of human life.17 When people talk these 
days about “corporate crime,” “the corporate criminal,” or “white 
collar criminals,” usually they are talking about people who staff such 
institutions. The subject of this Article is therefore the employee of 
the sizeable business firm who is potentially subject to criminal 
punishment for conduct relating to her job.18 Nonetheless, the term 
white collar crime remains ubiquitous in this Article as elsewhere 
because it pervades public discourse and, for lawyers, it references the 
legal concepts, statutes, and doctrines that govern the field of 
corporate crime. 
Second, assertions about privilege are, of course, assertions 
about equality. To say that law and legal institutions privilege the 
white collar offender is to posit an elevated position relative to other 
offenders. In comparing classes of criminal offenders, one runs into 
normative thickets such as deciding, for example, whether mass 
manufacture and sale of methamphetamine cause more or less social 
harm than the draining of large numbers of retirement accounts. The 
objective here is not to argue the case for or against any particular 
comparative advantage in the legal system—or to address any of the 
 
 16. See generally John Braithwaite, Crime and the Average American, 27 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 215 (1993). 
 17. It has long been understood, and continues to be appreciated with greater 
sophistication, that institutional context—particularly that of corporations and other business 
firms—has strong explanatory power with respect to the commission of white collar offenses 
and plays an essential role in the detection and control of such offenses. See WEISBURD ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 93, 177; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 695–99; Buell, The Blaming 
Function, supra note 15, at 491–506; Stanton Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The 
Organization as Weapon in White Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403, 1422–26 (1982). 
 18. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & RICHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: 
A TYPOLOGY 188–89 (2d ed. 1973) (distinguishing white collar crime from corporate crime and 
defining corporate crimes as those committed for the corporation’s purposes by corporate 
officials and the corporation itself). 
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many critical questions about the American treatment of drugs, guns, 
violence, and immigration. 
To the extent reference to the “street” offender will facilitate the 
discussion that follows, that shorthand is meant to represent the 
typical case of a nonwealthy violator charged with an offense 
involving violence, drugs, or weapons committed more or less apart 
from the workplace. Because most corporate crime is pursued in 
federal court,19 the most direct reference point is treatment of the 
street criminal in federal court. Though this obviously excludes the 
great majority of criminal offenders in the United States,20 it should 
not affect the substance of this Article’s claims. Scholars of criminal 
law do not assert that the federal law of crime and punishment is less 
severe on the street criminal than are state regimes—at least once 
offenders have been selected for prosecution.21 
Third and last, this Article makes many empirical claims but has 
no pretensions to being a rigorous empirical study. A wide-angle view 
of the criminal-justice system is needed to develop a better 
understanding of the normative question posed here. At such 
distance, the system is not amenable to quantitative modeling. It is 
too complicated and the available data are beset by gaps and 
omissions. Data are nonetheless presented as suggestive and useful, 
and are supplied against the background of qualitative institutional 
description. The claim is made now (and in the interests of brevity 
will not be repeated) that empirical uncertainty—even large 
uncertainty—should be no basis for scholarship to decline to lend a 
clarifying voice to a noisy and important public debate. Many issues 
discussed in the following pages beg for full empirical treatment and 
the following discussion may help define such research questions. 
 
 19. I have been unable to locate data to establish this point. It is certainly true with respect 
to the highest-profile cases. New York also actively prosecutes in the corporate realm. But the 
only major individual defendant in a state prosecution in a corporate case who comes to mind 
from the last decade or so is Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco Corporation, who was 
severely prosecuted by the Manhattan district attorney. See People v. Kozlowski, 898 N.E.2d 
891, 894 (N.Y. 2008) (“After a nearly six-month trial, a jury convicted defendants of 12 counts of 
first degree grand larceny, eight counts of first degree falsifying business records, one count of 
fourth degree conspiracy and one Martin Act count of securities fraud.” (citations omitted)). 
 20. See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 
1097, 1099–1100 (2013) (reporting that federal prisons held about 200,000 persons versus 1.4 
million in state prisons). 
 21. Quite to the contrary. See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization 
of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 668–75 (1997) (“Notwithstanding some significant 
exceptions, defendants typically fare considerably worse when prosecuted in federal court.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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This Article examines five parts of the criminal process that 
determine outcomes for offenders, proceeding from least to most 
difficult in terms of the question of privilege. Part I looks at 
sentencing. Part II addresses the scope of substantive crimes. Part III 
deals with the law of procedure and evidence. Part IV discusses the 
allocation of enforcement resources. Part V takes up the matter of 
defense resources. 
I.  SENTENCING 
White collar offenders used to receive notoriously lighter 
sentences than street offenders in federal court.22 Probation, 
community service, fines, and short terms of imprisonment followed 
by early parole were commonplace. Such relatively lenient sentencing 
was one of the major motivations for Congress to create the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, which in turn promulgated the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.23 The seemingly unbridled subjectivity with 
which judges sentenced white collar offenders created inter-offender, 
inter-judge, and inter-district disparities that did not square with a 
 
 22. For discussions of the history of federal white collar sentencing since 1970, and the role 
it has played in the creation and evolution of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see S. REP. NO. 
98-225, at 91–92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274–75 (considering the use of 
probation and concluding that in many cases “the heightened deterrent effect of incarceration” 
was not given its due, “particularly in instances of major white collar crime”); Frank O. 
Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the 
Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That 
Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 385–91 (2004) (discussing the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s adherence to and departure from its historical approach to sentencing for 
economic crimes in crafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Stephen Breyer, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 
20–21 (1988) (discussing the compromises made in the creation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, including “the Commission’s decision to increase the severity of punishment for 
white-collar crime”); Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1644–45 (2007) (criticizing excessively harsh increases in the length of 
fraud sentences as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Daniel Richman, Federal White 
Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55–
62 (2013) (discussing the rise and fall of sentence lengths under the guidelines in the context of 
judicial discretion). A study of federal prosecutions in New York found that imprisonment was 
not as rare a sanction in white collar cases as may have been believed in the late 1970s and early 
1980s: 46.4 percent of white collar defendants received some prison time whereas 49.7 percent 
of defendants who committed “[c]ommon [c]rimes” received some prison time. The mean 
sentence length was 21.3 months for white collar defendants versus 25.1 months for “[c]ommon 
[c]rime” defendants. WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 130–31. 
 23. S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 22, at 91–92. 
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commitment to equality in punishment.24 As with much of the 
sentencing-reform movement, there were also many who believed 
that, equality aside, sentences for financial crimes had just been too 
lenient for too long.25 
Things have come a long way since enactment of the guidelines 
in 1987. As much as the first-generation statutes and guidelines 
constrained judges from case-specific leniency, channeled more white 
collar cases toward imprisonment, and abolished parole, later 
legislation and amendments in the 1990s and early 2000s turned white 
collar sentencing in federal court into a harsh business. Without 
repeating what observers have documented elsewhere,26 one can see 
the gravity of contemporary punishment in three ways. 
First, look at how the present iteration of the guidelines 
governing fraud work out for a prototypical corporate defendant. In a 
public company accounting-fraud case, it is possible for an offender 
with no prior record to find himself at a level on the guidelines that 
requires a sentence of life imprisonment.27 Like all federal sentences, 
this would mean life with no possibility of parole: a terminal prison 
sentence. Potential life sentences for financial crimes, and those 
carrying scores of years of imprisonment, primarily result from two 
features. First, guidelines calculations in economic cases start with 
total dollar loss to victims, which can be extremely high in cases 
involving financial instruments traded in large liquid markets.28 
Second, the guidelines governing white collar cases have a dizzying 
array of add-ons to an offender’s point total—for things ranging from 
abuse of trust to “jeopardiz[ing] the safety and soundness of a 
financial institution”—that end up applying commonly rather than 
rarely in corporate fraud cases.29 
 
 24. A high degree of subjectivity in sentencing, of course, did not mean that sentencing was 
necessarily unprincipled. A famous deep-interview study of sentencing decisions by federal 
judges in white collar cases showed that judges coalesced around a series of common 
considerations, most of them unsurprising and uncontroversial. See generally STANTON 
WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988). 
 25. Bowman, supra note 22, at 385. 
 26. See supra note 22. 
 27. See Buell, supra note 22, at 1643–44. 
 28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2012). I have calculated 
the suggested sentencing range for a hypothetical white collar offender elsewhere. Buell, supra 
note 22, at 1643–44. 
 29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(15), 3B1.3. 
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These “specific offense characteristics,” in the argot of federal 
sentencing, have accreted over time, as Congress and the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (not to mention the public) have responded 
to waves of market disruption by looking for ways to make 
punishments more severe for corporate criminals.30 Although the 
guidelines bear most of the responsibility for the potential for such 
extremely long sentences, Congress has also raised the statutory 
maxima for major federal offenses in the white collar realm, thereby 
removing any real ceilings on punishment for complex corporate 
cases, which almost always include multiple counts of charge and 
conviction.31 
Second, look at recent sentencing reports from the field. 
Particularly in the last several years, it has become common for a 
federal district judge to impose a sentence of imprisonment on a 
white collar offender that is measured in double-digit years, and not 
infrequently in decades. An unscientific review of the biweekly White 
Collar Crime Report, a reliable source published by Bloomberg BNA 
that reports on notable developments in white collar cases, illustrates 
that severe sentences have become normal. In an arbitrarily selected 
eighteen-month period (January 10, 2011, to June 19, 2012), 
Bloomberg BNA reported on 187 sentences of 60 months or more of 
imprisonment imposed in federal white collar prosecutions. The mean 
term of imprisonment in those 187 cases was 144 months; the median 
was 108 months. An imprisonment term of ten years (120 months) or 
more was imposed in 84 of the 187 sentences (45 percent).32 Dozens 
and dozens of financial offenders are now being routinely sentenced 
to serve a decade or more in prison. Even if Bloomberg BNA reports 
only cases with greater notoriety, the numbers belie any assertion that 
courts are reliably lenient on white collar defendants. 
Some of these lengthy sentences are nonetheless substantially 
below much longer ones dictated by the guidelines. The hedge fund 
manager Raj Rajaratnam, for example, received an unprecedented 
sentence of eleven years in prison for insider trading, although the 
guidelines called for twenty years.33 It is important to remember that 
 
 30. Bowman, supra note 22, at 400–01. 
 31. Id. at 404–05. 
 32. A table of these cases, including the defendant’s name, the nature of the offense, the 
date of sentence, the jurisdiction, the sentence of imprisonment, and the fine (when available) is 
on file with the author. 
 33. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2012 WL 362031, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 31, 2012). 
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these sentences do not come with any possibilities for reconsideration 
or early release. Some federal judges have openly expressed shock 
and alarm about nominal guidelines results in fraud cases that they 
see as deeply irrational.34 
As best as can be determined, no literal sentence of life without 
parole has been imposed in a corporate crime case. Given the age of 
many corporate violators, however, the longest sentences are 
effectively life sentences. There has been no serious call to authorize 
the death penalty for white collar offenders. But if the absence of 
death sentences and the scarcity of sentences of life without parole 
distinguish the corporate offender from the street criminal, one 
cannot argue that federal sentencing law and practice—which govern 
most corporate violators—privilege the white collar criminal without 
arguing for a reordering of longstanding arrangements around 
proportionality in punishment.35 
Third, the recent severity of sentences in cases covered by media 
such as Bloomberg BNA occurred against the background of a 
substantial increase in average sentences for all types of white collar 
offenders. U.S. Sentencing Commission data show major increases in 
fraud sentences. In 1996, the mean sentence in all federal fraud cases 
was 13.2 months imprisonment.36 Between 1996 and 2011, that mean 
fraud sentence steadily rose through the mid- and high-teens into the 
low twenties, reaching a high of 23.2 months in 2010.37 (The mean 
 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(characterizing the guidelines-prescribed punishment as “draconian”); United States v. Adelson, 
441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (criticizing “the utter travesty of justice that 
sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic” as “patently absurd on 
[its] face”); see also United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216 (JG), 2010 WL 3940724, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[I]n some cases the fair sentence can drift quite far away from the 
advisory range, which is, after all, but one of eight factors the sentencing judge must consider.”). 
 35. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008). 
 36. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 22 tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/1996/TAB-13.pdf. 
 37. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_
and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table13.pdf. Many of the data files that make up the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s Interactive Sourcebook are available on the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s website, see Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.
gov/Research_and_Statistics/Datafiles/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013), as are the Annual 
Sourcebooks, see Annual Reports & Sourcebooks Archive, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/Archives.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).  
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fraud sentence in 2011 was 23.0 months.38) Meanwhile, the mean 
federal sentence for all bribery prosecutions rose from 13.1 months to 
19.0 months.39 
Perhaps surprisingly, federal sentences for violent and drug 
crimes have declined. During the same years 1996 to 2011, the overall 
mean federal criminal sentence fell from 50.7 to 43.0 months.40 The 
mean federal robbery sentence dropped from 110.9 months to 83.0 
months, and the mean sentence for drug trafficking declined from 
82.8 months to 70.0 months (albeit with greater fluctuation from year 
to year in these two categories than in the fraud and bribery 
categories).41 
Federal robbery and drug cases are, generally speaking, serious 
criminal cases. They represent large portions of the federal docket. 
One might want to argue that a typical federal fraud case should be 
punished the same as a typical federal drug case. Fair enough, 
perhaps. But the data show that sentences in the two types of cases 
have been moving in opposite directions. 
Of course, narcotics enforcement in the United States remains 
more punitive than white collar enforcement for the overall U.S. 
population. In 2011, federal courts imposed three times as many drug-
trafficking sentences as fraud sentences, and the mean sentence 
length was three times greater in the drug cases than in the fraud 
 
  Preguidelines (pre-1987) sentence means for fraud cases were nominally lower. See, 
e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1984, at 42 tbl.4.3 (1989) (reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence 
in 1984 was 27.6 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1986, at 40 tbl.4.2 (1990) (reporting that the 
mean federal fraud sentence in 1986 was 32.6 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 1982–93, at 17 tbl.17 (1996) 
(reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence in 1982 was 28.3 months); BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 1980–87, at 5 tbl.10 (1989) 
(reporting that the mean federal fraud sentence in 1980 was 27.1 months). However, these 
preguidelines sentences were imposed under a parole system at a time when federal prisoners 
on average served about 60 percent of the time imposed at sentencing. WILLIAM J. SABOL & 
JOHN MCGREADY, URBAN INST., TIME SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS, 1986–97, 
at 1 (1999); see also id. at 5, 7 (reporting that, in 1986, the average time served for fraud was 16.9 
months for sentenced offenders and 13.2 months for offenders released from prison). 
 38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2011/sbtoc11.htm.  
 39. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 36, tbl.13, with U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 38, tbl.13. 
 40. See supra note 39. 
 41. See supra note 39. 
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cases.42 But consider, for sake of contrast, the serious white collar 
sentence next to the federal narcotics sentence. Many people 
probably think drugs are nearly always punished more harshly than 
white collar crime in the federal system. However, the 2011 mean 
federal drug-trafficking sentence of 70 months was half the mean 
sentence of 144 months imposed in the 187 Bloomberg BNA–
reported white collar sentences of 60 months or more examined 
above.43 
For measuring the overall criminal-justice system, these two data 
points are apples and oranges. The point is simply that anyone who 
believes that the serious corporate offender is routinely allowed to 
carry on with life after criminal conviction, whereas prison life is 
reserved for the drug dealer and violent criminal, is under a 
misapprehension.44 
Before moving on from sentencing, one should note something 
else. In 2005, the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Booker45 
that Congress could not make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
binding on judges without violating the Sixth Amendment.46 As the 
Court has stressed in later decisions, sentencing judges not only may 
but must treat the guidelines as only an advisory starting point in 
imposing sentence.47 Why then do judges continue to impose severe 
 
 42. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 38, tbl.13. 
 43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 44. Unfortunately, the sentencing data cannot tell us a great deal about who these 
offenders are: big fish versus little fish, rich versus middle class or poor, and other deeper 
descriptions. The data do show that, as compared to federal drug defendants, federal fraud 
defendants are less male, slightly less white, substantially older, and much more often college 
educated. Compared to federal violent crime offenders, federal fraud defendants are much less 
male, very slightly more white, substantially older, and much more often college educated. A 
table summarizing this demographic information is on file with the Duke Law Journal. The 
statistics reflect data maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics as part of its Compendium of 
Justice Statistics Series, many of which reports are available online. See Publications & 
Products: Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). The data tables for 2004 and 2006–2010 
have not been published but were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are on file 
with the Duke Law Journal. Average percentages were then calculated by adding the data from 
each year between 2000 and 2010 and dividing by ten. (The data from 2005 were not used 
because the bureau changed its calculation methods for that year.) Thanks to Charles 
Weisselberg for urging this line of inquiry. 
 45. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 46. Id. at 226–27. 
 47. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (recognizing that sentences 
may vary from the guidelines, especially where the individual case deviates from the 
“heartland” of what the commission intended that the guidelines cover); Gall v. United States, 
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sentences on corporate offenders, while at the same time the Justice 
Department and even the U.S. Sentencing Commission have begun to 
worry that the preguidelines dynamic of disparate sentencing is 
creeping back into federal courtrooms?48 
There is not space here for treatment of the complex judicial, 
legislative, and administrative politics of sentencing law. However, 
consider two speculative points. First, if sentences are not veering 
back to the “old days” of probation and community service for 
corporate violators, maybe that is because today’s federal judges have 
internalized the view that such crimes usually should be punished 
with imprisonment. Second, if many sentences (even longer ones) are 
now imposed in deviation from what the guidelines dictate, maybe 
 
552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark. 
The Guidelines are not the only consideration, however.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 
350 (2007) (“The sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases, may depart 
[from the Guidelines].”). 
 48. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 
American Lawyer/National Law Journal Summit (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111115.html (identifying federal sentencing 
disparities, particularly in financial fraud cases as a “serious challenge[]” to sentencing policy). 
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, post-Booker white collar offenders received 
sentences 9.7 percent lower than drug-trafficking offenders, whereas in the period immediately 
prior to Booker, the disparity was not statistically significant. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 75 (2006); 
Casey C. Kannenberg, From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrine As 
Applied to White-Collar Criminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP. L. 349, 358–72 (2008) 
(describing decisions of the federal courts of appeals since Booker that have approved a variety 
of grounds for sentencing white collar offenders more leniently than provided for by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First 
Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–34 (2010) (finding, in the examination of one district, significant 
increases in sentence disparities from judge to judge in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Booker). See generally Federal Sentencing Options After Booker: Current State of 
Federal Sentencing: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-
16/Hearing_Transcript_20120216.pdf. One federal judge has sharply questioned why the Justice 
Department is complaining in public fora yet not challenging more white collar sentences on 
appeal. United States v. Ovid, No. 09-CR-216 (JG), 2010 WL 3940724, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 
1, 2010) (Gleeson, J.); see also United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (observing that one of the key reasons behind the introduction of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines was the disparity in sentencing between white collar and street crime); United States 
v. Whitehead, 559 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“We should not, by 
inaction and excessive deference, be inviting people to open up shop scamming law-abiding 
individuals or corporations out of hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, and then 
accepting that if on conviction they say that they are sorry, they need not serve any jail time.”); 
United States v. Ruff, 535 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., dissenting) (“To provide for 
a mere slap on the wrist of those convicted of serious economic crimes, with no or virtually no 
time imprisoned as punishment, strikes a blow to the integrity of our criminal justice system.”). 
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that is not because judges favor leniency for white collar violators but 
because the fraud guidelines have become so harsh that they are no 
longer much help to the sensible jurist trying to punish rationally and 
proportionately.49 
Among the harder questions in American criminal justice are 
which sorts of white collar offenders should go to prison and whether 
prison sentences in such cases ought commonly to exceed, for 
example, five or even ten years. Some would argue that corporate 
offenders, who are apt to be heavily invested in, and supported by, 
economic and social structures such as jobs, houses, cars, bank 
accounts, class networks, and families, have much more to lose when 
punished criminally—and therefore can be deterred by, or will suffer 
sufficient retribution through, short terms of imprisonment.50 Others 
would say that a legal system that confers a leniency or mercy resting 
on economic and social capital offends principles of equal justice.51 
However one comes out on these questions, federal law appears 
not to have much interest in them, at least in significant corporate 
cases.52 Present arrangements allow one to demonstrate the genuine 
 
 49. That problem is not unique to the white collar context, as the long struggle over the 
treatment of crack cocaine in federal sentencing illustrates. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems 
To Be the Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 765, 789–91 (2011) (listing reasons why Congress reconsidered “the erroneous 
100:1 powder-crack ratio”); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1283, 1305 (1995) (“Even while affirming the [crack] sentences, federal judges 
repeatedly have condemned them . . . as excessive and unjust.”). 
 50. For example, consider the disagreement between the en banc majority and dissent in 
United States v. Tomko. Compare Tomko, 562 F.3d at 575 (holding that the lower court did not 
abuse discretion in sentencing), with id. at 586 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (arguing that “relying on a 
hefty fine in lieu of imprisonment as a means to deter [the defendant] from future criminal 
activity only reinforces the perception that wealthy defendants can buy their way out of a prison 
sentence”). See also United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“With 
[the defendant’s] reputation ruined by his conviction, it was extremely unlikely that he would 
ever involve himself in future misconduct.”). 
 51. For example, examine the arguments advanced by the Government in United States v. 
Rajaratnam. See Government’s Reply Sentencing Memorandum at 16–17, United States v. 
Rajaratnam, No. S2 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2012 WL 362031 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012), 2011 WL 
4021120 (“[G]iven [the defendant’s] background, privileges, resources, and position in society, 
his crimes warrant a more severe . . . sentence of imprisonment.”). 
 52. Some would put the point both more strongly and more generally: 
There is no point in discussing the abstractions and nuances of proportionality when 
in some rough sense American punishment is so wildly disproportionate to crime, 
whether we focus on crime and punishment in the collective sense or in regard to the 
specific misconduct of individuals. . . . [W]e are long past the point of marginally 
identifying bad acts to punish but instead use our penal laws to add new tranches of 
offenders to a vast and self-reinforcing status. 
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harshness of sentencing in this field without having to answer fraught 
questions of proportionality in punishment between white collar and 
street crimes. Sentences of twenty years and up, with no possibility 
for parole, for offenders who are typically in midlife do not leave 
much room for further increases, at least not without a theory of why 
fraud should be punished like murder. One looking to establish the 
privilege of the corporate violator must look elsewhere than 
sentencing law and practice. 
II.  DEFINING CRIME 
A. White Collar Offense Definition 
Turning to how the law defines crimes, the potential white collar 
defendant is in particular jeopardy in at least four ways. 
First, white collar crimes typically take place in benign social 
settings in which the only difference between crime and commerce 
may be the defendant’s state of mind. For example, to commit fraud 
is to do a usually innocuous act—such as to make a representation of 
fact in a business transaction—with a prohibited state of mind, 
namely, the specific intent to defraud the counterparty. To criminally 
possess drugs or a firearm, or to victimize another through an 
aggravated form of assault, is to engage in conduct that is facially—or, 
if one prefers, presumptively—criminal, assuming that a basic mental 
state like being aware of engaging in that conduct can be inferred, as 
is typical, from the conduct itself.53 By contrast, a prosecution that 
involves an actus reus that is usually benign, and therefore turns on 
the unobservable phenomenon of mental state, can be more difficult 
to anticipate, harder to defend against, and more likely to produce 
error by the fact finder. 
Mental states may be harder to observe than actions but they are 
also easier to mistake. And when mistakes are made, they may be 
more difficult to expose. “I wasn’t there” or “I didn’t do it” are not 
typically winning arguments in white collar cases. 
Second, white collar offenses sometimes turn on fine points 
about degree of activity or harm that are not often pivotal with street 
 
Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1237 
(2012). 
 53. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 115–18 (1978) (discussing the 
“pattern of manifest criminality” among crimes that are “objectively discernible at the time that 
[they] occur[]”). 
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crimes, at least not as to guilt. Though a certain amount of waste 
emission is legal and necessary to the manufacture of industrial 
products, exceeding a specified allowable amount can transform 
permissible discharge into pollution and trigger criminal liability.54 
Any amount of killing, theft, or controlled-substance possession is 
facially, or presumptively, criminal. The large number of federal 
regulatory offenses, many of them fine-grained in definition, means 
that a corporate actor may commit a crime by doing less than the 
street offender and may find it harder to prevail against a determined 
prosecutor.55 
Third, white collar offenses are often both vaguer and broader 
than their street crime cousins. It is much less clear what it means to 
“devise a scheme or artifice to defraud” another,56 or convey 
something of value to an official that counts as a bribe,57 or engage in 
a borderline form of coercion that constitutes extortion,58 than what it 
means to break and enter a dwelling house with intent to commit a 
felony therein or “possess heroin with the intent to distribute.”59 A 
statute that prohibits all false statements in matters of federal 
government jurisdiction60 covers a massively larger realm of behavior 
than one that bans possession of firearms by convicted felons.61 The 
notoriously sprawling federal criminal code can be mined for dozens 
of these comparative examples. 
In the corporate realm, substantive-offense definitions cast a 
longer shadow than they do over the street. That is true even if one 
considers only the within-statute breadth of a few commonly 
 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 239–40 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
defendant’s criminal conviction of violating effluent restrictions when a company’s discharges 
were “double or triple the levels allowed by the permit”); see also United States v. Weitzenhoff, 
35 F.3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) 
(“We have now made felons of a large number of innocent people doing socially valuable 
work.”). 
 55. For a more complete discussion of the criminalization of regulatory offenses, especially 
in the environmental realm, see generally George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and 
Other High Crimes: The Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1417 (2007). 
 56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  
 57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
 58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 59. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  
 61. See id. § 922(g).  
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prosecuted offenses, such as fraud62 and obstruction of justice.63 The 
shadow grows much larger when one accounts for the well-known 
proliferation, duplication, and overlap of white collar and regulatory 
offenses in the federal criminal code, as well as the duplication of 
many of those offenses in state criminal codes, some of which are 
more actively enforced than before.64 
Fourth, when definitions of white collar crime do not turn on the 
element of mental state, they often dispense with mens rea. The 
federal code is famously full of strict-liability crimes (sometimes 
termed “regulatory” or “public welfare” offenses), many of them 
supplements to broader projects of the administrative state in areas 
such as environmental protection, product safety, and control of 
government ethics.65 These kinds of crimes, which have fewer and less 
 
 62. See Buell, Novel Fraud, supra note 15, at 1987–96 (“Expansion of fraud law . . . appears 
to be a persistent and unavoidable feature of the liberal regulatory state.”). 
 63. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction 
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 678–79 (2006) (“[T]he non-coercive 
obstruction provisions are . . . overbroad—leaving much to the discretion of prosecutors.”). 
 64. See John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation, 
ENGAGE, Oct. 2004, at 23, 23–27 (2004) (estimating that the federal code contains over four 
thousand criminal offenses and describing methodological problems involved in counting the 
offenses); John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Congress 
has continued to add federal crimes at a rate of 56.5 per year and finding that there were over 
4,450 federal crimes in 2007); Pamela Bucy, Jonathan Diesenhaus, Marc S. Raspanti, Holly 
Chestnut, Katherine Merrell & Chad Vacarella, States, Statutes and Fraud: A Study of Emerging 
State Efforts To Combat White Collar Crime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1535–36 (2010) 
(discussing the increasing implementation of state laws mirroring the Federal False Claims Act); 
Deborah L. Harris, Achieving Worker Safety Through Environmental Crimes Prosecutions, U.S. 
ATT’YS BULL., July 2011, at 58, 59–62 (discussing the overlap between federal environmental 
statutes and worker safety laws); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 703, 713–14 (2005) (“[O]vercriminalization is not merely a problem of too many 
crimes . . . [but] encompasses a broad array of issues . . . .”); Roger J. Marzulla & Brett J. 
Kappel, Nowhere To Run, Nowhere To Hide: Criminal Liability for Violations of Environmental 
Statutes in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 204–06 (1991) (summarizing the expansion of 
environmental criminal statutes); see also TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5–14 (1998) 
(“Congressional activity making essentially local conduct a federal crime has accelerated 
greatly, notably in areas in which existing state law already criminalizes the same conduct.”). 
 65. See BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. AND NAT’L ASS’N 
OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL 
INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW IX (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_
media/2010/pdf/WithoutIntent_lo-res.pdf (reporting a study finding that in the 109th Congress 
(2005–2006), 446 new nonviolent criminal offenses were proposed, 57 percent of which “lacked 
an adequate mens rea requirement”). This proliferation of strict-liability offenses in the white 
collar arena has also been noted on the state level. See Aaron F. Kass, Note, Mindless Guilt: 
Negative Aspects of State Environmental Prosecutions Using the Public Welfare Exception, 29 
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demanding mental state requirements than definitions of more 
traditional crimes, are easy to commit and can be hard to defend. 
Other criminal offenders face arguably similar forms of offense: 
immigration crimes, for example, are mostly status offenses and are 
stuffing federal jails and prisons;66 or drug-possession offenses that, as 
a practical matter, can criminalize large populations, especially 
chemically dependent and mentally ill persons.67 But these still are not 
strict-liability crimes in the legal sense. Perhaps outside the context of 
sex crimes, where offense definitions have ballooned in recent years,68 
 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 517, 536–41 (2005) (discussing the increasing 
prosecution of environmental crimes as strict-liability offenses). 
 66. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32369, IMMIGRATION-RELATED 
DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12 (2012) (reporting that the average U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement daily detention population increased by more than 50 
percent, from 20,429 in 2001 to 32,953 in 2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
11-187, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND 
COSTS 6–10, 34–37 (2011) (reporting that approximately three hundred thousand “criminal 
aliens,” defined as noncitizens convicted of any crime including an immigration crime, were 
housed in local, state, and federal prisons and jails in 2009, at a total annual cost of 
approximately $1.6 billion); Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, TRAC (June 
12, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283 (reporting that criminal immigration 
prosecutions had been on the rise since 2006 but peaked at 21,686 in February 2011, before 
falling to 19,149 in March 2012); DHS-Immigration Ranks First in Terms of Share of All Federal 
Criminal Convictions, TRAC (2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsshare.html 
(reporting that the Department of Homeland Security accounted for a greater percentage of 
federal criminal convictions than any other agency from 1999 to 2004, reaching almost 34 
percent of convictions in 2004); Prosecutions for March 2013, TRAC (May 9, 2013), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/hsaa/monthlymar13/fil (reporting that over 50 percent of 
all federal prosecutions in March 2012 were for immigration offenses). 
 67. See CELINDA FRANCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40732, FEDERAL DOMESTIC 
ILLEGAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: ARE THEY WORKING? 29 (2012) (reporting that, 
between 1997 and 2007, there were more than 323,000 drug arrests and 258,204 convictions at 
the federal level and that, in September 2008, inmates convicted on drug-related charges made 
up over 50 percent of the federal prison population—with almost one hundred thousand 
inmates in federal prisons on drug-related charges); Stephanie Hartwell, Triple Stigma: Persons 
with Mental Illness and Substance Abuse Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 15 CRIM. 
JUST. POL’Y REV. 84, 84–87 (2004) (describing and citing multiple studies estimating that as 
many as 80 percent of incarcerated persons have histories of drug and alcohol abuse and that 
approximately 16 percent of persons incarcerated in state prisons have mental illness); H. 
Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: 
A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 483–85 (1998) (reporting that clinical studies 
estimate that 10 to 15 percent of state inmates have severe mental illness). 
 68. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. 
L. REV. 885, 886–88 (1995) (identifying a “surge in popularity” of state sex-offender registration 
laws); Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex 
Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1076–81 (2012) (“Since the 1990s, registration-
worthy sex offenses have grown dramatically in number and scope.”); Richard Tewksbury, Exile 
at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 
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it is relatively rare for the common offender to confront felony 
prosecution in a situation in which the criminal law takes a genuinely 
no-fault approach to responsibility. 
None of the foregoing should be surprising. Most major 
corporate crimes are committed in economic settings in which it is 
difficult for the law to draw boundaries. Trading securities to grow 
retirement accounts is socially valuable; it is a felony to do so while 
having in one’s mind material nonpublic information acquired in 
breach of a duty. Seriously wrongful or highly undesirable conduct 
can be embedded within activities that are not just permissible but 
often beneficial and welcome. Line drawing is made harder by the 
frequent lack of consensus, across contexts and among different 
constituencies, about just which acts in ordinary business activities—
such as complex, innovative financing devices—should be deemed 
sufficiently out of bounds to warrant criminal sanctions. As discussed 
elsewhere, breadth and flexibility in substantive law are unavoidable 
responses to modern economic wrongdoing, despite strains on 
commitments to legality and fairness.69  
This description of substantive white collar criminal law as loose 
and expansive is not controversial. White collar crimes have long 
been prominent in the legion accounts of “overcriminalization” and 
“overfederalization” supplied by academics and practitioners over the 
last twenty years.70 With the exception of some notable Supreme 
Court decisions affecting a small number of statutes,71 the expansion 
 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007) (“The past several years have seen a number of 
increasingly severe restrictions imposed on criminal offenders . . . . The primary focus of these 
efforts has been on sex offenders . . . .”). 
 69. See Buell, Novel Fraud, supra note 15, at 2018–21 (discussing how breadth in fraud law 
is in part a result of the need to accommodate new forms of wrongdoing); Samuel W. Buell, The 
Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1563–64 (2008) (examining how important 
statutes and doctrine used to deal with sophisticated crime expand in response to innovations by 
offenders). 
 70. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 234–38 (examining the increasing use of federal 
criminal sanctions for law violations previously treated primarily through civil regulation); 
Luna, supra note 64, at 709–10 (“[T]he federal government has assumed unlimited authority to 
prosecute various forms of deception, with criminal statutes stretched to embrace garden-
variety dishonesty, promise-breaking, and breaches of fiduciary duty.”); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 525 (2001) (“[T]hrough the 1970s 
and 1980s . . . [t]he areas of biggest [federal criminal law] expansion involved white-collar 
crime . . . .”). 
 71. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (holding that 
a statute relating to obstruction of justice via witness tampering requires “consciousness of 
wrongdoing”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (holding that criminal 
structuring of currency transactions requires awareness that structuring is prohibited by law); 
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of white collar crime definition comes not just from the legislative 
process but also from routine statutory interpretation by federal 
judges.72 Although this Article’s subject is individual justice, the 
expansion of criminal liability for corporations themselves, especially 
in terms of agency liability for their employees’ crimes, also has been 
the subject of voluminous commentary and criticism.73 
B. Claims of Failure To Prosecute 
How could some observers still perceive the substantive criminal 
law to be insufficiently tough on the corporate offender? The 
problem must be more fundamental than gaps, loopholes, or 
oversights within and among statutes and judicial decisions. To the 
practitioner on either side of a corporate criminal investigation, there 
just do not seem to be many places left in federal law where a 
prosecutor cannot find a legal theory on which to rest any strong 
evidentiary case. 
An answer might lie in considering recent complaints about a 
dearth of criminal prosecutions for banking practices that led to the 
2008 financial crisis. Banking activities said by critics to deserve 
criminal prosecution typically involved alleged fraud in which clear 
proof of any particular trader’s or executive’s knowledge of the falsity 
or deceptiveness of the relevant statement or nondisclosure appeared 
to be lacking—and in which the sophisticated (and sometimes 
culpable) nature of counterparties muddied questions of deception 
and intent to deceive.74 The most persuasive criticism in this vein, by 
 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1991) (holding that a conviction for willful tax-
evasion requires proof of the defendant’s “voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal 
duty”). 
 72. See Buell, supra note 69, at 1526–55. 
 73. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 144–203 (Alon Harel & Keith N. 
Hylton eds., 2012) (providing a full descriptive and normative assessment of the law and current 
practice of corporate criminal liability). 
 74. An illustrative example is the purportedly evidentiary analysis, almost all of which is 
conclusory, of “blatant criminality” in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) industry by 
Charles Ferguson, director of the Academy Award–winning documentary Inside Job. CHARLES 
H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, AND 
THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA 2, 186–207 (2012). A more informative and factual analysis is a 
recent report on the extensive debates within the government about evidence and legal theories 
involving Lehman Brothers, which ultimately concluded in a decision not to charge the bank’s 
executives. See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid To Punish Lehman 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 8, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/
inside-the-end-of-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehman-executives. 
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Professor Frank Partnoy, concedes that the substantive criminal 
law—at least as interpreted, if not also as drafted—would have to be 
relaxed, in response to pressure from novel prosecution theories, for 
the relevant cases from the banking sector to succeed criminally.75 
Those questioning the Justice Department’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion have described a variety of cases as criminal 
candidates: from accounting strategies used by Lehman Brothers to 
improve its balance sheet toward the end of its days; to banks’ 
disregard of their underwriting standards in reviewing mortgages they 
securitized; to institutions selling mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
while shorting the housing market in their own portfolios based on 
expectations that the real-estate bubble would burst.76 
Some of these matters have been the subject of civil enforcement 
actions and lawsuits.77 But nowhere has anyone described the 
particular evidence that could be used in these cases to prove any 
individual’s specific intent to defraud to the criminal standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor has anyone demonstrated how 
to overcome defenses of good-faith reliance on purportedly adequate 
disclosure to reviewing accountants and lawyers or to sophisticated 
buyers of derivatives who were well-informed about the housing 
market. 
In considering theories of fraud in the MBS market, and the sort 
of evidence needed to prove such theories, remember that—at least 
in sophisticated markets for securities products that position a buyer 
long and a seller short, or vice versa—each party by definition 
believes the other is mistaken to execute the trade.78 That structural 
 
 75. Jeff Madrick & Frank Partnoy, Should Some Bankers Be Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Nov. 10, 2011, at 23, 25–26; Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s 
Banks?, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2013, at 60, 70–71. 
 76. See, e.g., Investigating Fraud and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–4, 
21–29 (2010) (statements of Sen. Kaufman) (describing “[a] bank [that] decides to relax its 
official underwriting standards” in a discussion of “[c]riminals on Wall Street [that] must be held 
to account”). See generally CONNAUGHTON, supra note 1, at 65–95. 
 77. E.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11 Civ. 6198 (DLC), 2012 
WL 5494923, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 206, 
212 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Complaint at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), 2011 WL 4965843; Complaint at 1, People v. J.P. 
Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 0451556-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 4479076. 
 78. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities 
Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 330–43 (2011). That remains 
true even when the short-selling trader chortles in a repellant way about the buyer’s choice to go 
long on the product. See Jesse Eisinger, Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Bad Behavior at Morgan 
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reality in trading markets makes fraud theories based on 
nondisclosure exceedingly difficult to construct in the absence of 
strong and well-defined fiduciary duties resting with those who went 
short on MBS.79 
Perhaps a fictional example would help. Suppose oil production 
finally starts to approach its limit as demand continues to increase. 
Global prices for oil begin to rise for good. Tex owns lots of property 
in North America with (expensively) reachable petroleum deposits. 
Tex believes that prices will now rise so fast that a historic 
breakthrough in energy technology will be forced, come to market 
relatively soon, and cause oil prices to crash. Tex begins selling off his 
properties. He packages different portfolios of property for buyers, 
including ones that have only the deposits that will be the most 
expensive to reach but that are also among the largest. Tex also buys 
lots of derivative securities products that give him extensive short 
positions on the value of petroleum deposits like those on his former 
lands. 
Rex, who runs an energy fund with numerous institutional and 
individual investors, believes there is big money to be made in what 
he sees as an irreversible spike in the oil market. Rex buys up Tex’s 
land and purchases derivatives that give him extensive long positions 
on the value of like properties. As oil prices keep rising, Rex keeps 
buying, and borrowing to buy more. In the end, Tex is proved right. A 
new, much-cheaper technology quickly hits the market and oil prices 
plunge so fast that Rex is unable to liquidate much of his property or 
 
Stanley, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/01/23/financial-crisis-lawsuit-suggests-bad-behavior-at-morgan-stanley. Unattractive trader 
behavior and how it reveals incentives that require regulatory control are not new issues. See 
FRANK PARTNOY, FIASCO: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 256–83 (1999) 
(providing an entertaining insider account of the activities of currency derivatives traders at 
major investment banks). 
 79. A different story might be a bank that originated MBS products while engaging in 
practices of reviewing individual mortgages involving far less scrutiny than was represented to 
buyers of the MBS. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has brought such 
a case against Bank of America (as successor to Countrywide Financial), but it is a civil False 
Claims Act case and no individuals have been charged. Complaint-In-Intervention of the 
United States of America at 2, United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12 
Civ. 1422 (JSR), 2012 WL 5974137 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012), 2012 WL 5235021. If there were 
good evidence of intentional deceit about loan standards by individual bankers, it would seem 
unlikely that the prosecutor would take the effort to bring this civil case but forgo a criminal 
case. Unfortunately the civil complaint is not detailed enough to discern the quality of the 
evidence of scienter. See also Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (interviewing former 
due-diligence reviewers who reported that they were instructed not to use the word “fraud” 
when describing problems with Countrywide mortgage loans that were not up to standards). 
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unwind his derivative positions fast enough. Rex and his investors are 
wiped out. Tex is rich. 
Tex has not committed fraud.80 Nor has he committed insider 
trading, which is a species of fraud. Rex is not guilty of fraud either, 
as long as his clients, no matter how naïve they were, gave Rex the 
authority to buy oil properties. Tex might be guilty of criminal fraud 
if Rex had asked about new energy technologies before buying Tex’s 
properties and Tex had falsely told Rex that Tex employed scientists 
and engineers who assured him that nothing would be viable for 
several decades. Or if Tex were also Rex’s realtor when Tex sold him 
the land and Tex did not say anything about his views on the energy 
market, his reasons for selling, or his means of selecting properties for 
each portfolio. 
These are the kind of facts a prosecutor needs to prove that a 
market trade constituted criminal fraud when executed—no matter 
how much an ex post perspective on the deal, or the market as a 
whole, points in favor of much tougher ex ante regulation. And, of 
course, even if the prosecutor solves the problem of constructing a 
viable theory of fraud, cases often founder on the problem of 
insufficient evidence to prove the theory beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Envision the cross-examination of the “victim” in an MBS case: the 
derivatives trader from Bank B who bought the long position from 
her counterpart trader at Bank A.) 
Another refrain in criticism of recent prosecutorial strategies is 
that Congress added a tough new substantive criminal law, as part of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),81 that is said to be 
tailor-made for holding corporate managers criminally responsible for 
wrongdoing that occurs on their watches.82 The statutory scheme 
requires a chief executive officer or chief financial officer of a public 
company to certify that she has reviewed her company’s public 
financial statements and that—to her knowledge—the filings are not 
false or misleading, that the company has controls to ensure that 
material information reaches her, and that any fraud or deficiency has 
been disclosed to the company’s auditors and board of directors.83 A 
 
 80. For a more extensive analysis, see Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 32–33 (2010) (examining the problem of fraud in fiduciary 
relationships). 
 81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 82. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street, supra note 1.  
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012). 
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companion criminal provision imposes a sentence of up to ten years 
on any executive who makes such a certification “knowing that the 
periodic report . . . does not comport with all the [certification] 
requirements.”84 
This offense did not much change criminal law. To convict a 
corporate executive of fraud, it has always been necessary to prove 
actual knowledge (or close to it) that material false or misleading 
information was disseminated.85 A criminal Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification case, as it has been called, would require the very same 
proof of mental state. The new offense is not a sword with which 
prosecutors can now slice through the complexity and layers of 
hierarchy in corporate finance to imprison top managers for the 
misdeeds of their underlings. At most, the new statutes marginally 
enhance deterrence by reminding executives of their longstanding 
obligation not to knowingly disseminate false information about a 
company’s finances. 
To “hold Wall Street criminally responsible” for marketing 
derivative products that unleashed mayhem in 2007 and 2008 would 
require, at the least, two sharp departures from the traditions and 
architecture of Anglo-American criminal law.86 First, neglect and 
disregard of risk would have to be sufficient bases to hold a person 
criminally responsible, at pain of long imprisonment, for fraud—a 
form of serious property crime. Conceptions of property crime have 
expanded over centuries to include not just direct physical takings but 
also takings by cheating, deception, and ever-novel forms of 
craftiness.87 But it has never been the case that a person can be 
convicted of a morally serious criminal intrusion on another’s 
property interests without proof that the offender engaged in the 
 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1). 
 85. See generally Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 512, 526–61 
(2011). 
 86. See, e.g., Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman) 
(noting that something like the financial crisis “doesn’t happen if there isn’t something bad 
going on,” and that for Goldman Sachs to have taken extensive short positions in the MBS 
market while selling long positions “sounds like fraud to me”); id. (statement of attorney David 
Boies) (noting that when “improper” things are done, you expect someone to go to jail). 
 87. See, e.g., 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 285–91 (1986) (discussing how the contours of property crime have evolved to prohibit 
fraudulent conduct, trickery, false pretenses, and false promises); FLETCHER, supra note 53, at 
90–113 (discussing—in the context of larceny and embezzlement—the evolution of the 
definition of “takings” to include intrusions on others’ property rights achieved by trickery or 
intimidation). 
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conduct with the specific objective of transgressing the relevant 
interests of the victim. 
To be sure, the criminal law occasionally treats risk taking as a 
grave matter. But it generally does so when life is at stake and social 
justifications are lacking—as with the crazed actor who gins up a 
game of Russian roulette while high on drugs, or the drunk who gets 
behind the wheel and careens into a pedestrian. Setting aside the 
appeal of applying colorful metaphors to Wall Street, moral desert is 
just not the same for the drunk driver who snuffs out the life of a 
complete stranger as it is for the trader who unloads a sketchy basket 
of securities on a less savvy trader, even if the loser in the trade was 
managing the assets of retail investors or pension funds. To equate 
such cases, one has to open a discussion about reordering the 
deontological structure of the criminal law. 
Second, principles of derivative responsibility in criminal law 
would have to be recast. The imposition of criminal liability for the 
conduct of another—through theories of accomplice and 
conspiratorial liability, or through special statutes designed to impose 
such responsibility—typically requires proof that the defendant was 
fully aware of the criminal nature of the primary actor’s conduct and 
shared the purpose that the criminal effort succeed.88 Exceptions have 
been crafted in which criminal liability can rest on a person’s 
supervisory responsibility for another who engages in criminal 
behavior—generally limited, by the way, to the corporate context.89 
But those exceptions have been approved only for certain kinds of 
offenses carrying light penalties.90 To hold a bank executive 
responsible for fraud on the basis of having looked the other way, or 
behavior of that sort, while her traders built up a financial house of 
 
 88. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 440–46, 477–84 (5th ed. 
2009); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 663–71, 712–21 (5th ed. 2010). 
 89. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (describing how courts have 
consistently interpreted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “as holding criminally 
accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority and supervisory responsibility 
reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the violation complained of”); United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (“[An] offense is committed [under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] . . . by all who do have such a responsible share in the 
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws . . . .”). 
 90. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–07 (1994) (explaining that “public 
welfare offenses have been created by Congress, and recognized by [the Supreme Court], in 
‘limited circumstances’” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978)); 
see also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 56–71 (2012) (providing a detailed account of the limited 
doctrines of “responsible corporate official” and “public welfare offense” liability). 
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cards that was doomed to collapse would, again, require discussion 
about revising principles of responsibility fundamental to criminal 
law’s general part.91 
Some of the civil actions that have followed the 2008 financial 
crisis supply evidence for the point that those displeased with the 
enforcement landscape are actually disgruntled with basic principles 
of law. Consider, for example, the attorney general of New York’s 
suit against J.P. Morgan (as acquirer of Bear Stearns). This splashy 
case of fraud in the packaging and sale of large quantities of MBS 
during the terminal stages of the housing bubble looked like an 
aggressive prosecutorial move to cast a net over a large representative 
pattern of abusive conduct in securitization of the housing market.92 
But the attorney general’s complaint, while reciting facts styled as 
constituting fraud, cited as legal authority New York’s exceptionally 
broad Martin Act,93 which prohibits far more than fraud. And the 
complaint did not invoke that statute’s criminal provisions.94 No 
individuals were named as responsible in the J.P. Morgan complaint 
and the state’s press release left the impression that proof of any 
criminal violation of the Martin Act was lacking and would not be 
forthcoming.95 
In the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) civil case 
against Citibank for marketing a basket of MBS that it filled with 
hand-picked losers, while simultaneously shorting the same products, 
the SEC charged an individual Citi banker who assembled the deal 
 
 91. Professor Sanford Kadish stressed this point fifty years ago in his foundational article 
on the use of criminal law in the economic sector. Kadish, supra note 8, at 430–31. 
 92. See Jean Eaglesham & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Sued on Mortgage Bonds, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, JPMorgan Unit Is Sued over Mortgage Pools, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at B1. 
 93. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–353 (McKinney 2012). 
 94. Complaint at 29, People v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, No. 0451556-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
filed Oct. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 4479076. 
 95. Id. at 1; see also Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11 Civ. 6198 
(DLC), 2012 WL 5494923, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012) (providing another example of a civil 
case lacking individual defendants); Complaint, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)), 2011 WL 4965843 (same); Peter J. 
Henning, In JPMorgan Suit, a Lack of New News, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:16 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/in-the-j-p-morgan-suit-a-lack-of-new-news (“The 
decision to pursue civil charges . . . means that the state’s attorney general will not have to prove 
fraudulent intent, only that the firm was negligent . . . . While easier to prove, that also indicates 
that the evidence to prove fraud was not strong enough to bring more serious charges.”). 
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with fraud.96 A jury acquitted him, on the civil burden of proof. The 
jurors said they thought others at the bank might have been more 
responsible.97 But, as the journalist James Stewart has explained in 
some detail, however shaky Citi’s products were at the time its traders 
sold them, the SEC’s case lacked clear evidence that Citi’s disclosures 
to the sophisticated buyers—about how the mortgages were selected 
and that the bank might take contrary positions in its own portfolio—
were negligent, much less intentionally fraudulent.98 This barrier 
would be present no matter who might have been charged within the 
organizational structure at Citi, including the firm itself. 
One might say that major changes in the substantive law of white 
collar crime would look less radical if seen in light of the long arc of 
criminal law’s development. White collar crimes as we know them 
formed no part of the old common law of crimes. The concept itself 
was not introduced into legal discourse until the twentieth century. 
But the definitions of the most serious white collar offenses involve 
either broader conceptions of how preexisting harms can be inflicted 
(for example, larceny evolved to fraud) or broader forms of harm 
regarded as serious enough to warrant punishment (for example, 
dumping substances harmful to public health, manipulating modern 
bureaucracies through corruption, or marketing faulty medicines). 
Although there has been an expansion of strict liability for low-
penalty regulatory offenses, the statutes and jurisprudence of white 
collar criminal law’s most serious offenses have adhered to the 
commitments of criminal law’s general part. 
Maybe there is a case for making serious crimes out of 
negligence, recklessness, or failure to supervise for those who control 
the levers of financial institutions that have the potential to inflict 
massive damage on average investors, employees, and citizens. As it 
 
 96. Complaint at 1–4, SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 
7388(JSR)), 2011 WL 4965844 (charging Citi banker Brian Stoker with securities fraud for 
“misrepresenting key deal terms” and “engaging in a course of business that operated as a fraud 
upon investors”). 
 97. See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-
encouragement-from-jury-that-ruled-against-it (noting that the jurors wondered “‘why the 
bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial’”). 
 98. See James B. Stewart, Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2011, at B1 (“[B]ad deals, even really bad deals like Citigroup’s, aren’t illegal. They’re 
not criminal. They’re not inherently fraudulent. If Citigroup’s clients, all of them sophisticated 
institutional investors, were foolish or careless enough to buy what Citigroup sold them, then 
arguably they deserved their losses.”). 
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happens, serious discussion is underway in the United Kingdom about 
adopting a highly novel criminal offense, punishable by 
imprisonment, of “reckless misconduct in the management of a 
bank.”99 
Perhaps the economy has reached a stage of development that 
requires rethinking of basic commitments about lines between 
criminal and other forms of legal responsibility. (Not to mention that 
other realms of behavior, such as drug consumption, may be subject 
to debate about decriminalization in equal measure.) First, though, 
one ought to appreciate the nature of a claim that present criminal 
law privileges the corporate offender. At its root, it is a claim external 
to existing structures—one that calls into question first principles of 
legal ordering and that faces a much steeper slope of argument than 
commonly believed. 
III.  PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
The law of criminal procedure and evidence does not afford a 
clearly identifiable advantage to the corporate offender. To see this 
point, it is necessary to set aside for the moment two factors 
addressed in Parts IV and V of this Article. One can think of these as 
potential selection effects bearing on the impact of procedural and 
evidentiary law. First, the government’s extent and methods of 
applying enforcement resources to the corporate offender (addressed 
in Part IV) might affect the kind and frequency of legal claims that 
arise and succeed in these prosecutions relative to others. Second, the 
resources available for legal defense in corporate cases relative to 
street crime prosecutions (addressed in Part V) might filter out claims 
before litigation. 
With those temporary caveats, the present contention is limited 
but important. Progressing through the major stages of a contested 
criminal prosecution—pretrial litigation, trial, and appeal—it is hard 
to see how one could claim that American law typically affords 
corporate actors charged with crimes a better chance of success than 
others subject to prosecution. Maybe this assertion is not surprising 
given that procedural and evidentiary laws are, in theory, rigorously 
trans-substantive. Still, it is important to appreciate that any 
 
 99. HM TREASURY & DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, 
2013, Cm. 8661, at 47 (U.K.); PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, 
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD, 2013-4, H.C. 175-II, at 516 (U.K.). 
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appearance of advantage to the white collar defendant does not 
derive from formal procedure and evidence. 
A. Pretrial Litigation 
In federal criminal prosecutions, a defendant has but three ways 
to defeat a case short of trial. One is to establish that the charges are 
legally defective in some fundamental way—that they fail to state a 
crime100 or that they are the product of a prosecutor’s exceptionally 
grave misconduct.101 The second is to persuade the court to suppress 
evidence that the government obtained in violation of a constitutional 
protection102 or contrary to a legal privilege, such as the one 
protecting attorney-client communications, and then to persuade the 
government to abandon its case because the excluded evidence is 
dispositive.103 The third avenue of pretrial defense, rejection of 
charges by a grand jury, is so famously rare that it can be treated as 
unimportant.104 
The first line of attack—dismissal of an indictment—infrequently 
succeeds in any federal criminal case. Between 2005 and 2009, less 
than 7 percent of federal felony cases were dismissed.105 One might 
 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that an 
indictment must “validly [state] the elements of [an] offense” to survive a pretrial motion to 
dismiss); Indictments, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 279, 281–317 (2011) (explaining that 
a defendant may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), bring a motion 
to dismiss a legally defective indictment at any time). 
 101. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254–57 (1988) (explaining 
that prosecutorial misconduct, when prejudicial to the defendant, is grounds for dismissal of an 
indictment); Indictments, supra note 100, at 281–90 (“A defendant may move to dismiss an 
indictment based on government misconduct, including vindictive prosecution, prosecutorial 
misconduct in grand jury proceedings, or prosecutorial misconduct outside the indictment 
process, though the conduct generally must be so outrageous that it violates ‘fundamental 
fairness’ or is ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 102. See The Exclusionary Rule, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 208, 208–27 (2011) 
(“Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth 
Amendment may not be introduced at trial to prove a defendant’s guilt.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing a 
conviction because of the erroneous admission of testimony that was protected by the attorney-
client privilege); Government Intrusion into Attorney-Client Relationship, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. 
REV. CRIM. PROC. 557, 557–59 (2011) (“Once a defendant’s right to counsel has attached, 
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship violates the Sixth Amendment if the 
defendant can show a realistic possibility that he or she was prejudiced by that intrusion.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (2004); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and 
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 274–76 (1995). 
 105. Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2005—Statistical Tables: Table 4.2, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT. (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2005/tables/fjs05st402.cfm 
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think dismissal claims have better chances on the margin in corporate 
cases, given that greater complexity and fuzziness of substantive law 
would leave more room for judicial discretion on the legal soundness 
of a charge. Or one could see flexibility in substantive law cutting the 
other way: leaving more room for novel prosecution theories and 
making courts hesitant to prevent the government from trying its 
case. 
The data do not support either of these theories. Between 2005 
and 2009, the dismissal rate for nonfraudulent property-crime cases (9 
percent) was slightly greater than for fraudulent property-crime cases 
(8 percent).106 The dismissal rates for violent crime and drug cases 
were 7 percent, equal to the general rate of dismissal for federal 
felony cases.107 The rarity of pretrial dismissals and the negligible 
differences in rates of dismissals make doubtful any claim that white 
collar defendants enjoy a particular advantage in persuading courts to 
stop prosecutions short of trial. 
The law of evidence suppression is even less likely to favor the 
individual defendant in a corporate case—again, holding aside how 
aggressively law enforcement authorities collect evidence in the first 
place. Unfortunately, the federal courts have not reported data on 
rates of grants and denials of suppression motions, overall or broken 
out by offense type.108 It is well known that criminal procedure on the 
 
[hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2006, 
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 25 tbl.4.2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/
fjs06st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice 
Statistics, 2007—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 20 tbl.4.2 (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2007/fjs07st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007]; 
Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2008—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 18 
tbl.4.2 (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf [hereinafter 
Motivans, Statistical Tables 2008]; Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009—Statistical 
Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 18 tbl.4.2 (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fjs09st.pdf [hereinafter Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009].  
 106. Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005, supra note 105; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006, supra 
note 105, at 25 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007, supra note 105, at 20 tbl.4.2; Motivans, 
Statistical Tables 2008, supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009, supra note 
105, at 18 tbl.4.2. 
 107. Motivans, Statistical Tables 2005, supra note 105; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2006, 
supra note 105, 25 at tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2007, supra note 105, at 20 tbl.4.2; 
Motivans, Statistical Tables 2008, supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2; Motivans, Statistical Tables 2009, 
supra note 105, at 18 tbl.4.2. 
 108. Survey research based on responses from four hundred judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys indicated that a suppression motion was made in 7.34 percent of federal cases 
and that suppression motions led to an acquittal or dismissal in 11.62 percent of those cases. 
Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, 
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street is dominated by the seizure of physical evidence and the 
eliciting of inculpatory statements—activities that have produced the 
lion’s share of constitutional law governing the investigation of crime. 
That body of doctrine, housed mostly in the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, is hardly friendly territory for street crime defendants. 
But the exclusionary rule survives and is enforced. When a street 
crime defendant does succeed in a pretrial suppression motion, such 
suppression often terminates the prosecution because of the 
dispositive nature of a confession in a murder case or seized narcotics 
in a drug prosecution.109 
Constitutional criminal procedure is a much different enterprise 
for the corporate defendant.110 Physical evidence in such cases, which 
consists of documentary records and hardly ever anything else, is 
rarely seized. It is usually subpoenaed and often supplied to the 
government voluntarily or through noncriminal regulatory channels. 
The Fourth Amendment has long been held not to require a warrant 
or probable cause for issuance of a subpoena for documents.111 
Suspects more frequently refuse to speak to investigators, usually 
do not give uncounseled statements to the government when they do, 
and often contract for forms of limited immunity before agreeing to 
speak.112 In modern white collar practice, the important issues of 
 
Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1711, 
1728 (2005). Older but more comprehensive data based on court records of several Midwest 
counties indicate that motions to suppress physical evidence were filed much more frequently in 
drug cases (13 percent) and weapon cases (12 percent) than property offense cases (3 percent). 
Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 594. These motions were successful 16.9 percent of the time and 
only 22 percent of those making successful motions were convicted as compared with 89 percent 
of those who were unsuccessful. Id. at 594–600. 
 109. See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 216–36 (describing how the attractiveness of low-cost 
suppression motions in street crime cases can divert defense counsel from efforts to investigate 
and contest ultimate guilt). 
 110. See generally Buell, Criminal Procedure, supra note 15 (describing some of the 
structural differences between criminal procedure in street crime cases and in corporate cases). 
 111. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (describing how the application of 
the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas has been limited); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 
376 (1911) (holding that “there is no unreasonable search and seizure [in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment] when a writ, suitably specific and properly limited in its scope, calls for the 
production of documents which . . . the party procuring its issuance is entitled to have 
produced”). 
 112. See generally Karen Patton Seymour & Allison Caffarone, Defending Individuals in 
Government Investigations, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS §§ 12:9–12:21 (Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman eds., 
2011). 
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criminal procedure tend to include conflict-of-interest matters 
governed by the Sixth Amendment and ethical codes, strictures 
involving secrecy and the Fifth Amendment in the grand jury context, 
barriers erected by the attorney-client privilege and, once in a while, 
the narrow Fifth Amendment protections that apply to compelled 
production of documents.113 
A white collar defendant rarely succeeds in suppressing before 
trial a pivotal item of proof, or even attempts to do so. Even when she 
does win such a motion, suppression of some contested evidence is 
unlikely to stop a case that is typically based on a mosaic of 
documents and testimony rather than a pivotal admission or piece of 
forensic proof. The smaller role for evidence suppression by courts 
may be due to the structure of evidence gathering in white collar 
cases: with fewer uncounseled interactions with law enforcement, 
there are fewer items of evidence to attempt to suppress. There is 
little reason to believe that corporate offenders benefit in any 
particular way from the exclusionary rule. 
B. Trial 
Conventional wisdom holds that white collar trials, at least the 
complex ones typical of the corporate context, are harder for the 
government. They take longer. They are heavy on documents and 
light on compelling eyewitnesses or decisive physical evidence. They 
involve technical issues that can be difficult to understand. They are 
dry. They turn on questions of intent that depend on inferences. And 
they often lack a victim with a face and a voice, or any victim at all.114 
All of this can make it hard to hold a jury’s attention, achieve clear 
jury comprehension, tell a compelling narrative to which jurors can 
 
 113. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales 
Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary “No,” 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237, 1292–95 (2008) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege is the only 
effective legal tool remaining to resist evidence disclosure in corporate criminal cases, at least 
for firms). 
 114. See Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White Collar 
Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 863–66 (2009) (noting that because “[s]tandards for 
criminality are vague, unsettled, and still developing,” there is a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding the “exact contours of the illegality” of certain corporate activities); Edmund W. 
Searby, Defending Complex Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, in WHITE COLLAR FRAUD 
INVESTIGATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS, BUILDING A 
DEFENSE STRATEGY, AND DEVELOPING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 27, 28 (2009) (noting that 
there is generally a “question of whether a crime has even occurred” in white collar crime 
cases).  
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relate, and motivate a jury to convict if doubt creeps into the ample 
spaces left for defense counsel by the sprawling and confusing aspects 
of a “paper case.”115 
The white collar offender would appear to come to trial with 
built-in advantages. The allegations against her lend themselves to 
doubt because her conduct took place within a generally benign 
business setting that provides ready fodder for “innocent” 
explanations.116 And she is likely to have socioeconomic 
characteristics and a life history that, for many jurors, may dampen 
the tendency to believe that the defendant, just because she was 
charged with a serious crime, probably did something wrong.117 She 
has no particular leg up when it comes to the legal rules governing 
admission of evidence, competency and examination of witnesses, 
jury argument, and the like. (Documents can be stubborn in the face 
of cross-examination.) But she may more easily tap into sympathies 
through the storytelling process that trial lawyers know is crucial to 
win over a juror. 
 
 115. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
169–70 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of developing a persuasive courtroom narrative due 
to the “heavy reliance on live testimony and advocacy” in the Anglo-American criminal trial 
system); Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of 
Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 150–63 (2012) (discussing the role of narratives 
in jurors’ determinations about a defendant’s mens rea); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, 
and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 286–302 (2012) (discussing how narratives factor into jury 
determinations and highlighting the distinctions of these narratives with respect to white collar 
trials). Recent examples of white collar trials that appear to fit this profile include prosecutions 
involving the broadband trading business of the Enron Corporation, see Yeager v. United 
States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), United States v. Shelby, 447 F. Supp. 2d 750 (S.D. Tex. 2006), 
United States v. Hirko, 447 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D. Tex. 2006), United States v. Yeager, 446 F. 
Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006), MBS trading by Bear Stearns employees in New York, see 
Zachary Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2009, at A1, and charges of accounting fraud between executives of the AOL and 
PurchasePro companies in Northern Virginia, see Carrie Johnson, 3 Acquitted in Lengthy AOL 
Trial, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at D1. The SEC also lost a recent trial involving alleged fraud 
in an MBS transaction by a Citibank trader, but the jury took the unusual step of asking the trial 
judge to read aloud a note urging the government to continue to pursue fraud in the banking 
industry. See Lattman, supra note 97. 
 116. Some have argued that there is evidence of reluctance among jurors to criminally 
penalize morally ambiguous conduct. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating 
Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV. 321, 335–36 (2006). 
 117. See William Alden & Azam Ahmed, A Conflicted Jury Finds Rajat Gupta Guilty, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 15, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/a-
conflicted-jury-finds-rajat-gupta-guilty (noting that some jurors considered “what he had done 
professionally . . . [and] were hoping he would walk out of [the] courthouse”). 
BUELL IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2013  10:30 AM 
860 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:823 
Another important trial factor is bail, a matter in which the white 
collar offender typically has a big advantage.118 The American system 
of pretrial detention is one of self-insurance. If a person can place 
sufficient assets at risk to assure a judge that she is not likely to flee, 
she makes bail. If she cannot, she does not. On the issue of flight risk, 
assets are a double-edged sword for some white collar offenders who 
have used their wealth to establish properties and other ties offshore. 
But this concern can usually be overcome because one who can afford 
an offshore home can usually post many times the value of such a 
property in bail. 
In addition, pretrial detention decisions in many jurisdictions rest 
heavily on considerations of “danger to the community.” (In federal 
court, such danger is statutorily presumed in all serious narcotics 
cases.119) It might go without saying that danger in these legal regimes 
does not mean risk that the defendant will defraud or mislead others 
and is very rarely a basis to deny bail to a white collar defendant. 
As any defense lawyer will explain, bail matters a great deal to a 
defendant’s leverage and chances of prevailing in criminal litigation.120 
The logistics of jails and prisons make it extremely difficult to prepare 
an effective trial defense when the defendant is in custody—especially 
if represented by an overworked public defender or court-appointed 
attorney who does not have enough hours in the day. All else equal, 
denial of bail makes a trial victory less likely. 
 
 118. See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 113 (finding that white collar offenders were 
more likely to receive bail than those who committed “[c]ommon [c]rimes” (1.7 percent of white 
collar defendants were denied bail, as opposed to 19.9 percent in “[c]ommon [c]rimes”)); see 
also Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The 
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720 
(2002) (reporting the results of an experimental study in Baltimore showing that represented 
persons were far more likely to achieve pretrial release). Justice Department data from 2003 to 
2004 indicate that a much greater percentage of defendants charged with white collar offenses 
were released on bail than those charged with other offenses. Defendants charged with 
fraudulent property offenses were released 70 percent of the time, more than double the 
percent released for all offenses (32.6 percent) and the percent released for violent crimes (27.4 
percent). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 46 tbl.3.1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cfjs04.pdf. Defendants charged with ordinary property offenses were released at a slightly 
higher rate (71.9 percent) than their white collar counterparts. Id. 
 119. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)–(g) (2012). Some states have implemented similar regimes. 
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-5.1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1(1)(c) (LexisNexis 
2012). 
 120. See 1 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 1.02[2] (Irene H. Rosen, Michella A. 
Zeppetello & Douglas L. Winston eds., 1992). 
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More importantly, pretrial detention increases a defendant’s 
incentives to accept a plea bargain. It is a nearly direct reduction in 
negotiating power. As a case drags along before trial, each day a 
defendant spends in jail is one less day of freedom to trade the 
prosecutor for a sentence reduction or to weigh against taking a run 
at acquittal. Time spent in pretrial detention is typically credited 
against the sentence ultimately imposed. If one is facing, for example, 
a likely sentence of four or five years in prison in the event of a trial 
loss and has spent a year in jail awaiting trial, a plea bargain for a 
sentence of eighteen or twenty-four months becomes nearly irrational 
to reject, regardless of the merits of the prosecution. 
The foregoing story about the trial prospects of the corporate 
defendant runs into a surprising fact. In the federal system at least, 
the acquittal rate in white collar trials is not significantly higher than 
in other cases.121 This bears repeating. Among the small percentage of 
federal criminal defendants who choose to contest a prosecution at 
trial, white collar defendants do not enjoy a higher chance of acquittal 
than others.122 
 
 121. Between 2005 and 2010, the 0.62 percent acquittal rate in federal white collar cases 
(embezzlement, fraud, and forgery) was close to the 0.54 percent acquittal rate across all federal 
criminal prosecutions. Over the same period, 7.6 percent of federal white collar cases and 9.5 
percent of all federal cases resulted in a disposition other than conviction. See ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 
2005, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2006) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2005]; ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 
DECEMBER 31, 2006, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2007) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 
2006]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2007, at 81 tbl.D-4 (2008) [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, 
STATISTICAL TABLES 2007]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 82 tbl.D-4 (2009) [hereinafter ADMIN. 
OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2009, at 82 tbl.D-4 (2010) [hereinafter 
ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 83 tbl.D-4 (2011) 
[hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2010]. These reports are available on the 
United States Courts website. Statistical Tables Archive, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/StatisticalTables_Archive.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2013). 
  One scholar, who assembled a more granular set of data reflecting acquittals by federal 
statute charged, found that the highest acquittal rates at federal trials are in civil rights cases, 
some types of assault and sexual abuse cases, and marijuana cases. The lowest rates are for cases 
of failure to file a tax return and for using a firearm in a violent crime that results in death. Kyle 
Graham, Crime, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1608–14 (2012). 
 122. An illustrative case is United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2011). The 
opinion recounts an exceedingly complex, lengthy, nuanced, and vigorously contested trial 
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Both this data and the wisdom on the ground that white collar 
defendants have better trial chances deserve to be taken seriously. 
The simplest way to reconcile them would be selection effects—
specifically what scholars often call in the litigation context the Priest-
Klein effect.123 On this account (discussed in Part IV), prosecutors 
choose their white collar prosecutions in the shadow of trials that 
appear hard and resource draining, for all of the reasons described 
above and more. 
When observers wonder why, in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, there has been a splashy wave of insider-trading prosecutions 
but almost no prosecutions relating to deals involving MBS, they 
often reach for elaborate speculation about government motives and 
the influence of the banking industry.124 The simpler explanation is 
that prosecutors bring cases they think they can win. And, of course, 
the quality of defense advocacy (discussed in Part V) may exert 
considerable pressure, since the prosecutor’s estimate of how difficult 
the case will be to prove could turn on how skilled the defense is 
likely to be in exploiting weak points in a messy and far-reaching case 
about communications among dozens of people within a large 
business organization. 
An enduring obstacle to contemporary criminal-justice 
scholarship—maybe the biggest one—is the lack of good data for 
 
involving accounting fraud related to a “finite reinsurance” deal between the American 
International Group and General Reinsurance Corporation. Id. at 267. The jury apparently 
managed to understand the case in spite of the obscurity and subtlety of the criminal conduct, 
returning convictions after four days of deliberations. Id. at 273. The defendants nonetheless 
won grants of new trials on appeal, after the court painstakingly worked its way through a 
myriad of issues involving evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct. Id. at 273–94. Almost every claim of error was rejected, but the court nonetheless 
found reversible error in one ruling admitting a stock-price chart into evidence and a turn of 
phrase in one jury instruction. Id. at 277. Reading the case produces both appreciation for how 
profoundly different corporate prosecutions are from those involving street crime and 
uncertainty about whether the corporate defendant, at bottom, faces better prospects than 
others of prevailing at trial or on appeal. 
 123. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 124. See, e.g., Rich Kirchen, Senate Candidate Hovde: Jail Wall Street Execs, Extend Social 
Security Age, MILWAUKEE BIZTALK (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
milwaukee/blog/2012/04/hovde-jail-wall-street-execs-extend.html (criticizing the Obama 
administration’s Justice Department for not prosecuting Wall Street executives and accusing the 
administration of going soft on Wall Street because of campaign contributions). See generally 
Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, supra note 1 (pointing to the revolving door between the 
SEC or Justice Department and white collar defense firms, as well as the large campaign 
contributions made by banks, as reasons why bankers have not been prosecuted in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis). 
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measuring and understanding prosecutors’ charging decisions, 
especially in the federal system which grants extensive discretionary 
power. One can only speculate that the white collar offender’s trial 
advantage, if there is one, is cashed out well before trial—in the lower 
likelihood of being charged due to the discretionary enforcer 
perceiving the case as chancy. The salient comparative question might 
be whether prosecutors are more risk averse in corporate charging, 
not whether the evidentiary rules and trial procedures that actually 
control what happens in courtrooms make white collar convictions 
harder to secure. But more on this in Part V. 
C. Appeal 
Complexity and ambiguity in substantive criminal prohibitions 
would seem to make the white collar offender’s chance of reversal on 
appeal, or success on a later collateral attack, significantly higher than 
those of the defendant appealing a conviction and sentence for a 
routine street crime. It seems plausible that the white collar offender 
would benefit from greater attention and sympathy from appellate 
judges by virtue of her familiarity to them as a demographic matter, 
and the comfort these judges are likely to have with her more skilled, 
more frequently appearing advocate. 
The data call these hypotheses into question. The overall 
reversal rate for federal criminal appeals decided on the merits was 
approximately 10 percent for the years 2002 through 2010.125 That 
period included a year (2005) in which a change in sentencing law 
caused an extraordinary number of reversals. Typical annual reversal 
rates have been closer to 8 percent.126 Offense-specific reversal rates 
do not vary greatly from that low average success rate: in 2010, the 
reversal rate was about 9.1 percent for fraud cases, 8.0 percent for 
“public order” cases (which include bribery, perjury, tax, and 
regulatory offenses, among others), 9.9 percent for violent crime 
 
 125. This rate reflects data maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics as part of its 
Compendium of Justice Statistics Series. See supra note 44. Data tables from the years 2002–
2004 are available online. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 84 tbl.6.4 (2004), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 88 tbl.6.4 (2005), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs03.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 118, 
at 86 tbl.6.4. The data tables from the years 2005–2010 have not been published but were 
obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are on file with the author. 
 126. See supra note 125. 
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cases, 6.0 percent for drug cases, 9.6 percent for weapons offenses, 
and 7.8 percent for immigration offenses.127 Fraud reversal rates 
fluctuated between 9 and 15 percent during the years 2002 through 
2010, averaging to a 12.5 percent reversal rate over the whole 
period.128 
Perhaps really well-financed corporate offenders in the most 
sophisticated cases enjoy marginal advantages in the appellate 
process over average fraud offenders. But it would be hard—and 
perhaps impossible—to find signs of that in existing data because the 
data do not include case-specific information. In any event, marginal 
differences in the otherwise very low rates of success on appeal of 
federal criminal defendants cannot be the source of any substantial 
privileging of the white collar defendant by the criminal-justice 
system. 
To summarize, available data and ground-level knowledge about 
the practice of federal criminal defense make it difficult to construct a 
plausible hypothesis that trans-substantive regimes of procedural and 
evidentiary law contain any mechanism of substantial advantage to 
the corporate crime defendant. 
IV.  ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 
As the national economy and its many markets have grown 
larger and more complex—and the modern regulatory state has 
expanded—the gulf between law as written and law as enforced has 
never been more consequential or more difficult to study and 
quantify. Some scholars have argued that, in the American criminal-
justice system, decisions of executive-branch actors are not just the 
most important input into outcomes but the only one of real 
consequence.129 The laws of sentencing, procedure, evidence, and 
substantive crime can be uninformative sources for assessing the 
chances that an individual will be subject to investigation, charged 
with a crime, or offered a particular disposition involving a plea and 
sentence. 
One therefore cannot evaluate the position of the corporate 
offender without considering what might be called the market for 
criminal enforcement—a market that derives many of its most 
 
 127. See supra note 125. 
 128. See supra note 125. 
 129. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–84 (2009). 
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important inputs from dynamic political systems. An argument can be 
mounted that current arrangements privilege the white collar 
offender. But, as with substantive crime definition, a clear-eyed 
understanding of enforcement practices should make one appreciate 
that radical change would be necessary to place the typical corporate 
actor in greater peril of criminal enforcement—rearrangements that 
would lead to a new order in the relationship between government 
and business. It should be equally appreciated that a call to rest the 
project of corporate control more heavily upon the system of criminal 
prosecution is open to general criticisms of the recent American 
tendency to criminalize intractable regulatory problems. 
A. Enforcement Systems 
On the face of matters, three factors could make an observer 
think that the street offender’s likelihood of arrest and prosecution is 
much higher than the white collar offender’s: where crimes are 
committed, how they are committed, and how many police patrol the 
spaces in which they are committed. Street-level police officers vastly 
outnumber investigators of fraud, regulatory, and like offenses in this 
country.130 Street crimes are more often committed, after all, on the 
street, where conduct is more likely to be visible to police and to 
generate arrests, both because of location and, as discussed in Part II, 
the clearer act-based nature of street crimes. White collar crimes are 
committed indoors, with paper, on computers and the telephone, and 
at remove from the surveillance and evidence-gathering tools of 
everyday policing. If crime definitions, as in the corporate realm, 
 
 130. In 2008, state and local law-enforcement agencies employed over 461,000 police officers 
and over 353,000 sheriffs but only 636 fraud investigators and 177 tax- or revenue-enforcement 
officers. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2, 8 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csllea08.pdf. In 2004, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection employed 28,200 officers. 
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2004, at 
6 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo04.pdf. In 2004, the U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service employed 2,999 officers, the IRS employed 2,791 criminal investigators, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency employed 209 investigators. Id. at 5–6. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employed 12,414 officers in 2004, but white collar crime is only 
one of its investigative priorities. Id. at 6. After September 11, 2011, the number of FBI agents 
devoted to white collar crime investigation dropped because of the diversion of agents to 
terrorism matters, but the number has returned to a nearly pre-9/11 level of about two thousand 
agents—with a higher portion of those agents than before devoted to larger, more complex 
financial investigations. See Investigating Fraud and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12–
13 (2010) (testimony of FBI Assistant Director Kevin L. Perkins). 
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depend only partially on loosely defined act requirements like 
“defrauding” a person, these offenders naturally will be more difficult 
to “catch in the act.” Finally, of course, outcomes are easily 
observable: American jails and prisons are loaded with street 
offenders and contain a relatively small number of white collar 
criminals.131 
Two considerations complicate the question of whether the white 
collar offender is subject to a much lower probability of detection and 
prosecution than the street offender. First, base rates of white collar 
crime are not known.132 The data on most street crimes, though not 
without flaws, are ample and have been for many decades. The data 
provide a fair idea of how many murders, robberies, and assaults 
occur, year over year and city to city.133 Researchers might even be 
able to derive reasonable estimates of rates of narcotics distribution 
and use.134 Data supply no good idea, however, how much insider 
trading or accounting fraud there is, how many pharmaceutical 
companies are violating food and drug laws at any moment in time, 
how much testimony is perjured, and so on.135 Popular beliefs about 
 
 131. Of the 1,365,800 prisoners under state jurisdiction in 2009, only 33,200 (2.4 percent) 
were charged with fraud offenses. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 28–29 tbls.16B, 17B (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. Of the 190,641 prisoners under federal jurisdiction 
in 2010, only 8,063 (4.2 percent) were charged with fraud offenses. Id. at 30 tbl.18. Of the 83,946 
federal criminal sentences imposed in 2010, 9.8 percent were for fraud and 3.6 percent were for 
other white collar crimes. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 38, fig.A. 
 132. See generally CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE MEASUREMENT OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA (2000), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf (discussing the methodological 
problems involved in measuring rates of white collar crime using data-reporting systems 
routinely used to measure crime rates). 
 133. According to FBI data, there were 14,612 murders, 354,396 robberies and 751,131 
aggravated assaults in the United States in 2011. Crime in the U.S. 2011: Tables: Table 1, FED. 
BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-1 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 134. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2010 an 
estimated 1.5 million Americans age 12 or older were cocaine users and an estimated 359,000 
Americans were dependent on heroin. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 11-4568, RESULTS FROM THE 
2010 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1, 
72 (2011). 
 135. Feasible empirical methods are at best only suggestive. See generally Laura H. Beny & 
H. Nejat Seyhun, Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Evidence 
from Takeovers 23 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-012, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103673 (finding that in 
recent years stock prices have increased more before the announcement of tender offers than 
they used to, and describing this as potential evidence of an increase in insider trading). 
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the incidence of corporate crime are likely based primarily on 
journalism that is not systematic and can be highly misleading. 
Consider, for example, a recent headline on the front page of the New 
York Times: “Madoff Aside, Financial Fraud Defies Policing,” under 
which appeared an article consisting of a description of a single Ponzi 
scheme in Los Angeles and one plaintiff-side attorney stating that 
“financial scams continue to happen at an alarming rate.”136 
The only observable data for these offenses are the number and 
visibility of prosecutions, which may have no value as a proxy for 
rates of violation. Federal white collar prosecutions, measured 
broadly to include all types of such offenses, fluctuated reasonably 
moderately in a range between about eight thousand and ten 
thousand cases annually in the years from 1992 to 2012, spanning 
several presidential administrations.137 
One can only speculate that if something like an old-fashioned 
patrol force walked the beat within America’s banks and other 
corporations, a much higher rate of apprehension of white collar 
offenders would result. Certainly deployment of more Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in the white collar field would 
enhance the probability of detection, and therefore number of 
convictions, at the margin. But the difference between several 
hundred agents nationally and several hundred more is not going to 
fundamentally alter the nature of white collar policing.138 The thought 
 
Employee surveys are hard to place a great deal of weight upon. See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., 
2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: WORKPLACE ETHICS IN TRANSITION 24 (2012), 
available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes (finding that 4 percent of survey respondents were aware 
of insider-trading activity); KPMG, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2008–2009 iii, 4, available at http://www.
financialexecutives.org/eweb/upload/chapter/Portland/KPMG%20Integrity%20Survey1.pdf 
(finding, in a survey of approximately 5,000 respondents who worked in firms employing 200 or 
more persons, that 13 percent of respondents who were employed in accounting and finance 
functions were aware of “falsification” or “manipulation” of financial information). 
 136. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Madoff Aside, Financial Fraud Defies 
Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at A1. See generally Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s 
Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 397 (2006). 
 137. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS CLEARINGHOUSE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
PROSECUTIONS FOR 2012 (2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For example, the total for 
2011 was 10,162 cases, whereas the 2012 total is projected to be 8,485 cases. Id. The early 2000s 
saw figures mostly in the low to mid-9,000s. Id. There was a dip to numbers in the low 8,000s 
during the years 2005–2008. Id. It seems likely that such fluctuations would turn at least in part 
on economic conditions and market disruptions. 
 138. See Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 1 (interviewing an FBI official about 
reduction in white collar investigative force when several hundred agents shifted to terrorism 
matters after September 11, 2001). 
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experiment is further complicated by the fact that white collar 
offenses are not detected by traditional policing methods but rather 
by complex surveillance systems that include everything from stock 
market computers to regulatory filings to reporting in the Wall Street 
Journal. 
Second, consideration of policing in the white collar realm must 
account for a large universe of enforcement that those who do not 
specialize in this area tend to elide. Institutions of the American 
administrative state heavily regulate most industries in which white 
collar offenses are committed. The securities fraudster must contend 
with the SEC, the polluter with the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the pharmaceutical company with the Food and Drug 
Administration, the hospital with the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the tax cheat with the IRS, the arms dealer with the 
Department of Defense, and so on. These agencies wield potent tools 
like investigative staffs, subpoena power, inspection rights, debarment 
authority, contract denying and awarding powers, access to 
prosecutors to initiate criminal cases, elaborate civil-enforcement 
mechanisms in which costly penalties can be imposed, and sometimes 
even guns, badges, and vests. Advances in information technology 
heighten the effects of mandatory reporting regimes and monitoring 
programs in the regulatory realm. 
Some observers of the administrative state argue, of course, that 
regulatory regimes in numerous industries are far too weak to do 
their jobs—understaffed, underfunded, undercut by members of 
Congress who do not support their missions, captured by industry, 
undermined by the campaign finance system, and so on.139 These 
complaints address the effectiveness of these agencies in 
accomplishing their primary missions: use of their civil regulatory 
powers to intervene ex ante to prevent harms from occurring in the 
first place. The point relevant to this Article is narrower. Whether or 
not these agencies “do a good job” according to any account of what 
regulatory agencies ought to do, their existence and activities 
introduce a layer and type of monitoring into the world of corporate 
activity that does not exist on the street and heightens exposure to 
criminal enforcement. 
 
 139. See generally RINA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE 
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND 
THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010). 
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Moreover, legislative schemes empowering civil-enforcement 
agencies frequently permit and incentivize private plaintiffs to bring 
parallel causes of action that can force information disclosure.140 Some 
of these legal frameworks protect and richly compensate corporate 
whistleblowers who provide information about law violations.141 
Although street crime informants can be rewarded too, those rewards 
usually take the form of reduced criminal charges for persons who are 
themselves implicated in crime.142 Monetary rewards for information 
about such crimes rarely involve the large sums that can be realized 
through, for example, a qui tam action in a healthcare fraud case.143 
And then there is the business firm itself. The law of corporate 
criminal liability in the United States notionally makes a firm 
criminally liable—with potentially far-reaching consequences to its 
ability to do business—whenever a single agent commits a crime 
within the scope of employment and with the intent, even in small 
part, to benefit the firm.144 In the shadow of this de jure regime, a de 
facto regime of corporate criminal liability has developed that says 
this: Corporations will be held criminally liable for the crimes of their 
agents unless they ferret out wrongdoers, turn them and all relevant 
evidence over to the government, and assist the government in the 
successful pursuit of criminal investigation and then conviction of 
those persons. If a firm does those things with sufficient zeal, it 
generally will be spared prosecution and offered a quasi-civil 
settlement in the form of a deferred prosecution or nonprosecution 
agreement.145 
The culpable offender in the corporate context can feel not just 
the full power of the Justice Department coming down on her. She 
 
 140. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting securities fraud); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (describing the judicially implied private right of action for 
securities fraud that violates 15 U.S.C. § 78j). 
 141. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (setting forth new 
whistleblower incentive and protection provisions); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 
(providing for private actions); see also David Kocieniewski, Get Out of Jail Free? No, It’s 
Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A1 (describing an award to the informant in a major tax-
evasion investigation involving U.S. taxpayers and Swiss banks). 
 142. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009). 
 143. See generally ROBERT FABRIKANT, PAUL E. KALB, MARK D. HOPSON & PAMELA H. 
BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 4.01A (2013). 
 144. De jure and de facto regimes of corporate criminal liability, and the relationship 
between the two, are explained in Arlen, supra note 73, at 144, 144–203. 
 145. Id. 
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can feel that power leveraged tenfold by her own employer’s ability 
and motivation to clear the government’s path to her door. This is by 
design. The theory is that fewer crimes will be committed in the 
otherwise opaque corporate context if managers and employees go to 
work every day in the shadow of a powerful public-private 
enforcement partnership—an enforcement system that is, by the way, 
arguably subject to far less regulation, constitutional and otherwise, 
than the system that operates on the street.146 
The street offender confronts lots and lots of police officers 
but—aside from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement—no specialized police forces, no major 
considerations about how to deal with problems of parallel 
proceedings, including civil litigation, and (except with immigration 
offenses) no employer-sponsored policing program. Of course, the 
average street offender would be unlikely to care about civil liability. 
He lacks the assets, economic standing, and social position that 
typically make civil enforcement matter to a person. His additional 
problems—and they are serious and growing—come after conviction, 
in the form of extensive collateral consequences of a felony record—
which also of course apply to convicted white collar offenders, who 
can face additional collateral effects such as professional or industry 
debarment.147 
Though the street offender often faces the criminal’s age-old 
worry about accomplices and coconspirators who might seek credit 
with the government by becoming informants, this dynamic hardly 
approximates the relationship between corporation and employee. 
Often a corporation’s best move, after all, is to do what street 
criminals rarely will: tell the government about the crime before the 
government knows about it. A recent example is the lenient 
settlement that Barclays Bank earned from the government for being 
 
 146. See generally Bruce Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Corporate Internal 
Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2013) 
(explaining the realities behind corporate internal investigations); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled 
Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (2007) 
(suggesting that the application of a civil regulatory model to criminal cases creates distortions 
because criminal prosecution involves individual liberty rather than mere financial sanctions). 
 147. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS pt. II (3d ed. 2004); see 
UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT prefatory note at 1–4 (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2009) (discussing the legal and social consequences 
of criminal convictions and the associated collateral effects). 
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the first firm to turn over its trove of information about who among 
its staff did what, and when they did it, in connection with the scandal 
over reporting of the London Interbank Offered Rate (known as 
LIBOR).148 Just reading the relatively terse settlement documents in 
the Barclays matter makes fairly clear that individual prosecutions 
are forthcoming. 
The white collar offender of course enjoys much greater freedom 
from the pervasive presence of cops on patrol who can routinely stop, 
search, and arrest him. In office buildings, there is no harassment 
through “stop and frisk” and misdemeanor arrests.149 But the 
corporate actor pays a steeper price than one might think in terms of 
directing assets and attention to the problem of avoiding government 
actions for law violations. 
It is difficult to say which situation is the one of greater exposure 
to prosecution, at least of the serious felony variety. 
Demographically, the young man who grows up in an area beset by 
drugs and guns (especially the young black man) is vastly more likely 
to end up in prison than the young man who proceeds through a 
university into the banking profession. It is less clear, though, that a 
corporate offender who sets about a major fraud or violation of a 
federal regulatory regime, and sustains that conduct over a period of 
months or years, is less likely to be discovered than a man who sells 
large amounts of illegal drugs for the same amount of time. Instincts 
and the composition of prison populations say yes. But there is, at the 
least, good reason to hesitate in guessing at the size of any disparity in 
probability. 
B. Political Economy of Enforcement 
Conventional wisdom holds that much, if not most, of the 
severity with which the American criminal-justice system treats the 
street offender—in the proliferation and broadening of offense 
 
 148. See Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Steven R. Peikin, David H. Braff, Jeffrey T. Scott & Matthew S. Fitzwater, Sullivan & 
Cromwell LLP (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
337201271017335469822.pdf (requiring Barclays’s cooperation and acknowledgment of the facts 
set forth in Appendix A of the letter). 
 149. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City 
Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. 
STAT. ASSOC. 813, 822 (2007) (presenting statistics indicating that there are disproportionately 
high stop-and-frisk rates among racial minorities in New York City); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1328–41 (2012) (noting that low profile misdemeanors, 
which are unlikely to be litigated, are often more heavily dictated by police action). 
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definitions, length of average sentences, frequency and extent of 
mandatory minimum penalties, force of recidivism enhancements, 
abolition of parole and early-release systems, heavy reliance on 
imprisonment as a sanction, and harshness of prison conditions—is 
explained by the street offender’s impotence in the political 
economy.150 Cracking down on the street is politically profitable 
because it is cheap and yields high returns. It might also approach 
conventional wisdom to believe that the white collar offender is more 
politically powerful than the street offender and, therefore, that the 
corporate offender’s advantages in the legal system are easily 
explainable as natural results of the political economy of crime.151 
In assessing such claims, one must again consider that the white 
collar offender typically operates under a giant noncriminal 
regulatory apparatus that does not exist in the world of the street 
offender. In the street offender’s political economy, legislators, 
enforcers, and judges (many of whom are elected) trade off the 
benefits of “toughness on crime” against relatively few costs—
primarily budget constraints and (sometimes) internalized norms of 
fairness, reasonableness, restraint, and the like. The white collar 
offender’s political economy includes a similar toughness-versus-
constraints tradeoff, but also a tradeoff, or at least large overlap, 
between criminal and noncriminal regulation. 
This complicated political story is not fully understood. In the 
wake of each wave of failures in capital markets, there is strong 
demand for punitive action on white collar crime. That demand is 
tempered, at both the legislative and adjudication levels, by advocacy 
efforts of the defense bar and corporate-lobbying organizations that 
are almost nonexistent in the realm of street crime. But legislators 
 
 150. See Stuntz, supra note 70, at 552–53 (discussing the relationship between breadth in 
substantive criminal law and the lack of interest group pressure to narrow offenses). 
 151. For example, the leading scholar of the political economy of federal criminal law 
enforcement describes in a recent essay his “deep skepticism about the possibility of a stable 
commitment to white collar enforcement” in the United States. Richman, supra note 22, at 64–
65. As he acknowledges, one’s view on the desirable level of enforcement depends inevitably on 
empirical hunches, impossible to verify, about the prevalence of white collar offenses. Id. 
Though the accounts of the corporate bar and corporate lobbies must be taken with a grain of 
salt, given their incentives to make noise (and their resources to do so), they would disagree 
with the assertion that there has not been, at least over the last two decades, heavy enforcement 
of white collar offenses and related civil regulatory violations. See generally, e.g., Glen Donath, 
Responding to Globalization and Stricter Enforcement in Today’s White Collar Climate, in 
MANAGING WHITE COLLAR LEGAL ISSUES: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING CLIENT 
EXPECTATIONS, CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF 
RECENT CASES 71 (2012). 
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and executive-branch officials profit politically when a Skilling or 
Ebbers or Madoff or Rajaratnam is sentenced to a long term of 
imprisonment in the wake of a financial scandal. Contemporary 
politicians infamously capitalize on being tough on street crime but 
they also like to be able to tell voters that they have been tough on 
corporate criminals. A myriad of evidence for this point exists, from 
the public statements of officials, to the repeated moves by Congress 
to increase statutory penalties in response to market crises, to the 
success of white collar prosecutors in ascending through state and 
federal political office.152 
One might even argue that the symbiosis working against the 
criminal offender can be more powerful in the case of the corporate 
violator. It is not just mutually beneficial to legislators and executive-
branch officials to be tough on corporate crime. It benefits firms too, 
because the focus on ex post punishment directs discussion about 
responses and remedies away from ex ante regulation.153 Accounts 
focused on bad apples and wrongdoers crowd out ones about systemic 
failure. Tough prosecution of individual miscreants strengthens the 
argument for leniency against firms themselves and their many 
“innocent” stakeholders. These approaches benefit large private 
institutions determined to hold down costs of doing business. And the 
perception of toughness benefits legislators, and executive-branch 
rulemakers and enforcers, who prefer to avoid blame for failing to 
prevent wrongdoing through regulation. It should not be surprising 
that the Bush administration from 2001 to 2009 had a record of both 
hostility to business regulation and aggressiveness in criminal 
prosecution of senior executives of large corporations.154 
 
 152. Rudolph Giuliani, former mayor of New York City and candidate for president, who 
led a prosecutorial assault on insider trading in the 1980s, is the most prominent example. 
Former New York Attorney General and Governor Eliot Spitzer, though following a more 
checkered path, comes more recently to mind. Conservative Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa 
has been perhaps the most notable example of an antiregulation member of Congress to urge 
vigorous prosecution of corporate fraud. See, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, 
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/HSBC-12-
13-12-letter-to-Holder-no-criminal-prosecutions.pdf. For accounts of congressional efforts to 
increase criminal penalties for fraud, see supra note 22. 
 153. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy 
Analysis, 82 WASH U. L.Q. 95, 115–17 (2004) (discussing the lower level of opposition by firms 
to harsher criminal penalties). 
 154. Bush and Enron’s Collapse, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.economist.com/
 node/938154; Mark Gongloff, Bush Seeks New Business Ethic: In Speech on Wall Street, 
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Another constituency—the bar—benefits from corporate crime 
enforcement. The corporate lawyer’s interests bear emphasis. 
Professor Charles Weisselberg and co-author Su Li have rigorously 
documented important facts that practitioners and students of 
corporate criminal enforcement have known anecdotally for some 
time: the size and profitability of corporate white collar defense 
practices have exploded in the last twenty years at the largest national 
law firms.155 Former prosecutors and government lawyers now 
dominate these practices. Big Law lawyers get a lot more work than 
they used to defending firms and their executives in government 
investigations and prosecutions. That work can be very lucrative.156 
The corporate defense bar is often in league with the corporate lobby 
in arguing for reforms that would restrain prosecutorial and 
enforcement practices. For example, these groups campaigned 
successfully to limit the pressuring of firms to waive attorney-client 
privilege in criminal investigations.157 But rarely have these groups 
organized efforts to repeal serious criminal offenses or curtail 
enforcement in particular areas. 
The entrenchment of this field of practice is evidence of how 
much potential criminal exposure now hangs over large firms. The 
effect of white collar practice growth is also dynamic. Lawyers 
working on both sides of these cases—and typically changing 
employment from one side to the other—have incentives to generate 
more cases as time goes on. To think that revolving-door effects in 
the field of corporate criminal law would lead to the squelching of 
meritorious prosecutions is simplistic. Without genuine prosecution 
experience, there is little for the departing government lawyer to sell 
to a private firm. Without prosecutions, there is nothing for the 
 
President Wants Longer Jail Terms, Tougher Laws To Curb Corporate Abuses, CNNMONEY 
(July 9, 2002, 4:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/09/news/bush. 
 155. See Weisselberg & Li, supra note 13, at 1291–92. Strikingly, the authors find a close 
correlation between a firm’s ranking in the “Am Law 100” and the percentage of its partners 
who hold themselves out as working in the area of white collar corporate defense. Id. at 1252–
53. 
 156. The Weisselberg and Li study has the industry-wide details, id. at 1263–72, but 
sometimes a single case nearly makes the point. In 2008, when the Siemens Corporation settled 
a massive criminal case involving Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, the company 
represented that, so far, it had paid over 500 million Euros in fees combined to one law firm and 
one auditing firm for responding to the investigation and prosecution. Press Release, Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, Investigation and Summary of Findings with Respect to the Proceedings in 
Munich and the US 8 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/
2008-12-PK/summary-e.pdf. 
 157. O’Sullivan, supra note 113, at 1241–43. 
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defense bar to sell to its clients. The economics and sociology of the 
corporate crime bar are much more complex and merit a great deal 
more study. But even on a simple and fairly cynical analysis, public 
officials would lack motivation to shield corporate offenders from 
prosecution. 
Even less persuasive is the claim that enforcement bureaucracies 
would protect corporate criminals because those individuals are large 
donors to election campaigns. This claim rests on two assumptions 
that are implausible to a reasonable observer, much less to anyone 
who has worked in a significant executive-branch position: First, that 
the value of any one person’s fundraising largesse would outweigh the 
value of satisfying public demand for harsh punishment of high-level 
corporate wrongdoers. And second, that it is the habit of presidential 
political advisers to direct Justice Department officials about whom to 
prosecute and the habit of department officials to respond to such 
direction. 
There is scant empirical evidence for such claims. President 
George W. Bush’s political operation was far more successful than 
President Barack Obama’s in raising money from the corporate 
sector, whereas the Justice Department under Bush brought more 
high-profile prosecutions of senior corporate executives than it has 
under Obama.158 (Remember Ken Lay, the big contributor to Bush’s 
campaigns?) One ought to be careful about asserting that the white 
collar offender is plainly monitored, investigated, and prosecuted at 
much lower probability or frequency than the street offender.159 At 
the least, serious obstacles exist to comparing the expected sanction 
of the two types of offender, especially at the level of reliable data. 
One might approach the question of privilege in enforcement 
from the angle of a thought experiment. What would things look like 
if corporate actors faced a substantially higher chance of 
apprehension and prosecution than at present? It would have to be a 
state of affairs in which the government not only did more policing 
than it does at present, through all of its elaborate regulatory 
apparatuses, but in which the government treated the corporate actor 
 
 158. See supra notes 1, 3–4, 154 and accompanying text. 
 159. The authors of a treatise for practitioners in the field of corporate crime recently 
concluded that there is “little doubt that we have reached a high water mark for government 
investigations in which the risk of becoming swept up in such an investigation is greater than 
ever before.” Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman, White Collar Landscape: Regulators, 
Targets and Priorities, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT 
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 112, § 1:9. 
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like it handles the drug dealer, alien smuggler, gunrunner, or loan 
shark. To do this, corporate criminal enforcement would need to rely 
on two staples of policing that account for a lot of volume in street 
cases, especially federal ones, but that would seriously shake up the 
business world. 
First, a heavy and reliable flow of accomplice witnesses would 
have to be produced through determined campaigns to arrest and 
prosecute lots of people for lower-level offenses and offer them 
sentencing relief in exchange for testimony. To be sure, many 
important cases of corporate crime have been built through charges 
that have led to guilty pleas of cooperating witnesses. But that is the 
standard, work-up-the-ladder tactic in most criminal investigations. In 
other realms of criminal activity, particularly organized crime and 
drug trafficking, enforcers cast a much wider net, hauling in lots of 
fish with the knowledge that a certain number will know something 
significant about larger fish—even if the government often does not 
know what. 
How would that strategy work in, for example, the investment 
banking world, in which the routine activities of traders are not 
exactly the equivalent of hand-to-hand cocaine sales on a street 
corner? It would not work, of course, short of a radical redefinition of 
the legality of banking practices in the United States or, as a few have 
proposed, a campaign to arrest all the drug users and prostitution 
clients who happen to hold down jobs in the financial industry. 
Second, the government would need to engage in the kind of 
real-time monitoring of criminal activity that it deploys in 
sophisticated organized crime, drug, and terrorism investigations. 
Given the size and complexity of global financial markets, this would 
require vastly larger regulatory systems employing thousands more 
investigators, as well as funding public salaries that could seriously 
compete with the private sector for top-echelon talent and expertise. 
Even if such practical problems could be solved, Fourth Amendment 
rights and other legal protections would often require the government 
to have some evidence of criminal conduct in hand before it could 
raid corporate office buildings and surveil email, telephone, and other 
communications not already subject to regulatory monitoring 
requirements. 
The need for such evidence turns one back to the problem of 
how to generate large numbers of informants and accomplice 
witnesses in corporate cases. Criminal investigations that are covert 
and contemporaneous with criminal activity are not unheard of in 
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white collar crime. (The recent spate of Wall Street insider-trading 
prosecutions provide examples.) But such cases remain exceptional. 
They are difficult to envision in areas like accounting fraud or 
deception in the trading of novel banking products—in which it is 
very hard to know that a crime is afoot until things go sour and 
unwind, and in which it is rare for the government to hear someone 
blow the whistle without the press and everyone else hearing it at the 
same time. 
Recall the discussion of substantive crime definition in Part II. 
By nature, sophisticated white collar offenses do not lend themselves 
to proof through the kind of forensic evidence and stranger 
eyewitness common with street crimes. Such prosecutions, even those 
that include the rare smoking gun document, require witnesses who 
are in a position to testify to facts that clearly establish the state of 
mind of other persons. 
At bottom, to argue that the corporate actor is privileged over 
the street offender because law enforcement is less pervasive and 
resourceful in her realm is, as with substantive crime definition, to call 
into question matters of basic ordering that are prior to particular 
disputes about enforcement bureaucracies and their strategies and 
activities. When the corporate actor engages in crime, she does so in a 
social setting in which she is embedded in activities that society has 
chosen, at the basic level of capitalist economic structures, to treat as 
not only legitimate but desirable. To make her conduct subject to 
omnipresent policing would require profound redesign of the 
relationship between the state and business firms. Such redesign 
would need to go far beyond hiring larger staffs at the SEC and other 
regulatory agencies. 
One can argue that such change would, on balance, enhance 
social welfare. But the argument should be recognized for what it is, 
and not taken as a contention merely about skew in the priorities of 
legislators and executive-branch officials explained by plain old 
capture and inertia. Proponents of such positions should further be 
prepared to answer an objection. Modern America’s tendency to 
criminalize problems it finds hard to solve through other means has 
provoked a rising chorus of critics.160 They say, first, that criminal law 
is being hijacked from its proper social mission and, second, that mass 
criminalization imposes crippling material and moral costs. The 
 
 160. See supra note 2. 
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advocate for renovation of corporate crime enforcement has the 
burden to either rebut this genre of argument or show it to be 
inapposite to the field of business conduct. 
V.  DEFENSE RESOURCES 
One could fairly answer this Article’s question by saying that of 
course the corporate offender is privileged: she is richer and has more 
social capital than the typical individual charged with a street crime. 
True as that statement may be, it is a demographic point that does not 
speak directly to arrangements in law and legal institutions. Maybe 
the question could be reframed this way: Does the corporate 
offender’s wealth advantage cash out to better treatment by the law 
and institutions of criminal enforcement? Even this question is a bit 
too simple. No one could dispute that a defendant who has millions to 
spend on an attorney is better off, on average and all else equal, than 
one who has to rely on a minimalist, state-funded defense. 
Even in street crime cases of the highest stakes, the pattern of 
seriously below-standard performance by appointed defense counsel 
(and, less often, public defenders) is notorious and demoralizing.161 
Further troubling is a fact lost on many who do not study crime in the 
 
 161. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer 
Make?: The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes 17–19 (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/
RAND_WR870.pdf (finding, in an empirical study of random attorney assignment for indigent 
defendants in Philadelphia, that representation by a professionalized public defender office 
versus a low-paid court-appointed counsel made conviction 19 percent less likely, life sentence 
62 percent less likely, and prison term 24 percent shorter); see also David S. Abrams & Albert 
H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment To Investigate Attorney 
Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1167–69 (2007) (finding that, when controlling for several 
important variables, years of experience of an assigned public defender correlated with lower 
sentence outcomes for defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death 
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835–39 (1994) 
(describing incompetence by appointed attorneys in death penalty cases, including a case in 
which a woman received the death penalty for arranging to have her abusive, adulterous 
husband killed after counsel failed to submit basic evidence and arrived at court drunk); Floyd 
Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does 
Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 407–12 (1991) (concluding 
from a review of many studies that the category of defense counsel does not matter to outcome, 
but observing that there is wide variation in quality of counsel within categories and that 
wealthy defendants are likely to enjoy better outcomes); Talia Nye-Keif, “Capital” Punishment 
or “Lack-of-Capital” Punishment? Indigent Death Penalty Defendants Are Penalized by a 
Procedurally Flawed Counsel Appointment Process, 10 SCHOLAR 211, 214–16 (2008) (describing 
several horror stories of incompetent-attorney representation leading to death penalty 
convictions, including use of passages of argument copied and pasted from previous cases). 
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corporate sector. It is not just that the poor or working-class 
defendant in many jurisdictions has no access to a good lawyer 
because she lacks the savings to pay for one. Many employees of large 
firms who violate the law on the job have something most Americans 
can only dream of: legal insurance. It is standard practice—and in 
many instances statutorily or contractually guaranteed—for firms to 
indemnify employees for legal-defense costs, or at least to advance 
those costs, after which “clawback” efforts are rarely pursued in the 
event of criminal conviction.162 A federal appellate court has even 
ruled that a corporate employee’s access to such funding enjoys, in 
some circumstances, constitutional protection under the Sixth 
Amendment.163 
Moving beyond the plain fact of resource disparity, the question 
of interest to this Article can be put more precisely: How exactly 
might the corporate offender leverage her wealth advantage into a 
better chance of escaping criminal sanction, and how might one 
estimate the quantity of advantage she enjoys at that point of 
leverage? The answers lie in a place that is surprising but also natural: 
bargaining over charging and pleas. 
A. Trial 
Start with trial, the place casual observers think of as the point of 
maximum wealth advantage. The popular image is the contrast 
between the overworked, woefully compensated appointed lawyer in 
the rural South and the Darrow-like wizard of cross-examination who 
is the most expensive hired gun in a big city jurisdiction. Anyone who 
follows notable cases in the media can conjure without effort many 
recent prosecutions that supply this imagery. 
 
 162. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 42–76 (2010) (describing the 
scope, extent, and pervasiveness of corporations’ insurance coverage of directors and officers 
for liability and defense costs associated with law violations on the job); Buell, Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 15, at 1650–55, 1658 (discussing how corporate insurance and 
indemnification cover individual legal-defense costs); Peter Lattman, Stuck with a Defense Tab, 
and Awaiting a Payback, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2012, at B1 (reporting that Goldman Sachs was 
legally required to advance the estimated $30 million in costs of the criminal defense of a former 
member of its board of directors convicted of insider trading for leaking proprietary information 
about board discussions, and that the company could not even begin to seek repayment until 
after resolution of the appeal of conviction); Gretchen Morgenson, Legal Fees Mount at Fannie 
and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at B1 (reporting that almost $50 million had been 
advanced over a three-year period to defend executives of troubled mortgage giants in 
regulatory actions and lawsuits). 
 163. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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But one should hesitate before concluding that such stereotypes 
represent the typical experience of the criminal defendant in a 
corporate case. There are abundant contrasting examples. The 
defense of Jeffrey Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, which was 
reported to have cost over $70 million in defense funds,164 resulted in a 
sentence of nearly twenty years in prison, which was ultimately 
reduced to fourteen years under an agreement to forgo collateral 
attack.165 Raj Rajaratnam, the former hedge fund chief convicted in a 
historically large insider-trading case, may have spent over $40 
million for a sentence of eleven years in prison.166 Allen Stanford, who 
ran a large bank that turned out to include a massive Ponzi scheme, 
churned through multiple teams of attorneys, private and appointed, 
who spent several years litigating an elaborate and multifaceted 
defense that nevertheless resulted in a sentence of 110 years in 
prison.167 
Then there is the overall data. In 2010 for example, the acquittal 
rate in federal trials of securities fraud, bank fraud, and mail fraud 
 
 164. Christopher Palmeri, The Sky-High Cost of Skilling’s Defense, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-10-19/the-sky-high-
cost-of-skillings-defensebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (noting 
that Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling spent almost $70 million on their defenses). 
 165. Tom Fowler, Former Enron CEO Sentence Cut to 14 Years, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2013, 
at A3. 
 166. Michael Rothfeld & Chad Bray, Loss Raises Question over Defense Strategy, WALL ST. 
J. (May 12, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870468190457
6319673566636108. The defense team for Rajat Gupta, a Goldman Sachs board member 
charged for supplying tips to Rajaratnam, reportedly cost $30 million, with most of that bill 
being advanced by Goldman Sachs. Lattman, supra note 162. Other examples of very high 
defense bills for white collar defendants include Sanjay Kumar of Computer Associates ($14.9 
million), Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco ($17.7 million and $8 million for each of two trials), Kirk 
Shelton of Cendant ($24 million), the Rigases of Adelphia ($25 million), and Richard Scrushy of 
HealthSouth ($32 million). Peter Lattman, Happy Anniversary DOJ! Love, Judge Kaplan, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 17, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/07/17/happy-
anniversary-love-judge-kaplan. 
 167. See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Andrew M. Harris, Allen Stanford Loses Bid for $100 
Million of Lloyd’s Director’s Insurance, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/allen-stanford-loses-bid-for-100-million-of-lloyd-s-directors-
insurance.html (reporting that Allen Stanford lost access to legal insurance after a judge found 
that he had violated terms of the insurance contract); Amir Efrati, How Many Lawyers Does It 
Take To Defend Allen Stanford?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 7, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2010/06/07/how-many-lawyers-does-it-take-to-defend-allen-stanford (noting that 120 
lawyers, paralegals and clerks from 10 different law firms worked as part of Stanford’s defense 
team); see also Mary Flood, Pay the Lawyers, Judge Says, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2010, at D1 
(describing litigation over whether Lloyd’s was required under an insurance policy to pay 
defense fees for Stanford); Clifford Krauss, Financier Is Sentenced to 110 Years for Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at B1 (discussing reactions to the sentencing of Stanford). 
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was nearly the same as it was for all federal criminal trials combined, 
a category dominated by immigration and drug prosecutions.168 This 
has been true of the data for many years.169 In the cases that go to trial 
in federal court, juries are not more likely to acquit the defendants 
with the hired-gun lawyers (assuming, as seems more than 
reasonable, that a significantly higher percentage of white collar 
defendants than street crime offenders are represented by retained 
counsel). Moreover, criminal trials are notoriously rare in federal 
court as a general matter.170 
B. Plea Bargaining 
To find the point of leverage from advantage in funding of 
counsel, one therefore must consider selection effects. If expensive 
lawyers do not produce significantly higher rates of acquittal, perhaps 
they make it less likely that a client will be charged with a crime. Or 
maybe they make it more likely that a client will be offered a 
favorable plea bargain that will make trial a less attractive alternative 
than it tends to be for the street crime defendant. In other words, 
maybe white collar cases that go to trial produce roughly the same 
 
 168. In 2010, the overall nonconviction rate was 6.5 percent and the nonconviction rate for 
white collar cases was 8.9 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2010, supra note 121, 
at 83 tbl.D-4. 
 169. In 2009, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.0 percent and the white collar 
nonconviction rate was 7.5 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009, supra note 121, 
at 82 tbl.D-4. In 2008, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.8 percent and the white collar 
nonconviction rate was 8.8 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008, supra note 121, 
at 82 tbl.D-4; In 2007, the overall nonconviction rate was 10.3 percent and the white collar 
nonconviction rate was 8.6 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2007, supra note 121, 
at 81 tbl.D-4. In 2006, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.7 percent and the white collar 
nonconviction rate was 8.2 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2006, supra note 121, 
at 81 tbl.D-4. In 2005, the overall nonconviction rate was 9.6 percent and the white collar 
nonconviction rate was 7.6 percent. ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2005, supra note 121, 
at 81 tbl.D-4. 
 170. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the 
Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226 
(2007) (collecting and discussing sources and data showing the decline in trial rates across the 
board in federal criminal cases during the 1990s and early 2000s). Federal criminal trials 
decreased during the 1990s from a high of 8,947 trials in 1990 to 6,746 trials in 2000. Judicial 
Facts and Figures 2005: Table 6.4, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/Table604.pdf. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of federal 
criminal trials modestly rose to 7,477. Id. Between 2005 and 2010, the number continued to rise 
and by 2010 had nearly reached the 1990 trial rate, with 8,445 federal criminal trials completed 
in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2010. Judicial Facts and Figures 2010: Table 6.4, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table604.
pdf. 
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acquittal rate not because lawyers in those cases are no more effective 
with juries but because more rigorous pretrial screening of weaker 
cases offsets the effects of superior trial advocacy. 
No empirical study has tested this hypothesis. It will be difficult 
to test, given the obstacles to empirical study of prosecutorial 
decisionmaking. The hypothesis is plausible in view of what is known 
about how the criminal-justice system operates. Recently the 
Supreme Court bracingly declared that plea bargaining “is the 
criminal justice system.”171 The empiricist John Pfaff has produced a 
potentially groundbreaking study finding that the source of soaring 
incarceration rates in the United States has not been more arrests or 
longer sentences but an increase in the number and frequency per 
defendant of prosecutors lodging felony charges.172 
Criminal law scholars are in near complete agreement that 
prosecutorial discretion now dominates the path that a particular case 
follows in the criminal system, for several reasons.173 Chief among 
those reasons are the huge overhang of substantive criminal law on 
the books beyond any reasonable picture of what could be enforced; 
the paucity of constitutional and statutory regulation of prosecutors’ 
decisions about whom and what to charge, and how to engage in plea 
bargaining; and the severity and frequently mandatory nature of 
sentencing law—coupled with the ability prosecutors typically have to 
induce or even compel courts to enforce sentencing rules or relax 
them.174 
 
 171. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (quotation mark 
omitted). 
 172. John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations 37–39 (Jan. 
23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990508. 
 173. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 129, at 876–77 (“[A] prosecutor’s decision about what 
charges to bring and what plea to accept amounts to a final adjudication in most criminal 
cases.”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 923–31 (2006) (describing how decisions of prosecutors drive sentencing results); 
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 393, 400–15 (2001) (“The charging decision is arguably the most important 
prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial 
discretion.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1521, 1521–23 (1981) (“The fate of most of those accused of crime is determined by prosecutors, 
but typically this determination takes place out of public view . . . .”); see also Mark L. Miller & 
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 125–28 (2008) (citing extensive 
scholarship concerned with prosecutorial power). 
 174. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1038–43 (2000) 
(explaining that plea bargaining took control of criminal justice because it enhanced the power 
of prosecutors and judges to dictate sentences and process cases); William J. Stuntz, Plea 
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These dynamics have the potential to operate with no less force 
in corporate crime than in street crime. As discussed in Parts I and II, 
federal substantive law is broad and deep in the field of corporate 
crime, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have the potential to be 
steeply punitive in such cases. Criminal procedure is trans-
substantive. Prosecutors have the same freedom in charging and 
bargaining in corporate cases as in all criminal cases. And the Justice 
Department does not place particularly stronger restraints on its 
ground-level prosecutors’ decisions in the business realm than in 
other areas. 
One can see, however, how discretionary dynamics might 
operate differently in cases with defense advocacy that is more 
vigorous and intervenes earlier. Corporate criminal practice is 
characterized by a kind and degree of defense lawyering at the 
precharge stage that is virtually nonexistent in street crime cases. 
White collar investigations are usually overt and typically lean toward 
cooperative forms of evidence gathering, such as subpoenas and 
interviews, as opposed to, for example, early morning raids with 
search warrants and surprise arrests of potential accomplice 
witnesses. There is no legal restriction on one’s ability to spend funds 
on a criminal defense prior to charging, even though there is no 
constitutional right at that stage to a lawyer’s help.175 Especially if 
 
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2551–58 (2004) 
(arguing that the structure and scope of substantive criminal law enables prosecutors to dictate 
pleas, which are no longer bargains struck meaningfully in the shadow of legal rights and 
liabilities). The tide may be turning in judicial attitudes toward regulation of plea bargaining, 
despite the longstanding doctrine that controls the process only lightly. See Stephanos Bibas, 
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1117, 1138–42 (2011) (discussing how, now that plea bargaining has become the norm in 
criminal prosecutions, it “needs tailored regulation in its own right, not simply a series of 
waivers of trial rights”). Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405–08 (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel extends to consideration of plea agreements), Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383–88 (2012) (same), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–74 
(2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel extends to informing the 
defendant of the risk of deportation), with Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372–73 (1978) 
(reaffirming broad prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining), and Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970) (holding that plea bargaining is not coercive in violation of the due 
process clause even if a life sentence is offered as an alternative to the possibility of being 
executed). 
 175. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 373 (2006) (“Actions by the government 
that affected only the payment of legal fees and defense costs for services rendered prior to the 
indictment . . . do not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”); see also Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered 
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to 
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the 
only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.”). 
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joint defense agreements are in use, the corporate actor and her 
counsel may have near full access to the flow of documents and 
statements that the government receives, and thereby an ability to 
know or at least predict what the government is doing with its 
investigation, and sometimes what it is likely to do next.176 (The 
comfort with this kind of system may explain, in part, the sense of 
unfairness expressed around Wall Street when the government 
recently deployed wiretaps in insider-trading cases.177) 
As discussed in Part IV, it is difficult to assess clearly the net 
position of the white collar offender in criminal investigations. On the 
one hand, the evidence against her generally consists of documents 
and the statements of others, which she has little ability to prevent 
from landing in the state’s possession and even less ability to exclude 
from the universe of trial proof. The practice of using the threat of 
firm-level criminal liability to persuade corporations to gather 
evidence of their own employees’ wrongdoing and provide it to the 
government dramatically reduces the corporate offender’s ability to 
prevent the government from building a case against her.178 And doing 
defense lawyers’ work in big, complex corporate crime cases involving 
hundreds of witnesses and millions of documents consumes resources 
at a rate not often encountered in street crime defense. 
 
 176. An important dimension of this question is the possibly ambiguous relationship 
between the position of the offending employee of a corporation and the explosion in the role of 
the corporate criminal defense lawyer which Weisselberg and Li document. See generally 
Weisselberg & Li, supra note 13. On the one hand, the prevalence of the modern corporate 
investigation has compelled large firms to purchase insurance covering defense costs and to 
bring more lawyers on the scene when law violations may be afoot, to do so as early as possible, 
and to supply representation for employees, including those who may have been involved in 
wrongdoing. Id. at 1268–72. On the other hand, the employee in the corporate case may find her 
range of options restricted in ways that are particular to corporate criminal cases: she may find 
herself unable meaningfully to rely on her Fifth Amendment privilege and her attorney, funded 
by the firm and often party to a joint defense agreement, may not provide the utmost 
independent judgment that might come with a private lawyer chosen by the employee. See 
Griffin, supra note 146, at 333–40 (discussing the additional risks to employees as individuals); 
N. Richard Janis, Ensuring Employee Rights in Internal Investigations, 36 HUM. RTS., Spring 
2009, at 10, 10 (discussing the representation of employees in internal investigations). 
 177. See Dennis Berman, Galleon’s Legacy: Wiretapping Insider Crime, WALL ST. J., May 
12, 2011, at C1 (noting that wiretapping “just wasn’t the way things were done” with Wall Street 
cases); see also Peter J. Henning, The Pitfalls of Wiretaps in White Collar Crime Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 25, 2011, 3:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/the-
pitfalls-of-wiretaps-in-white-collar-crime-cases (noting the problems with using wiretaps in 
white collar cases including increased privacy concerns). 
 178. See Arlen, supra note 73, at 144, 167–72. 
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On the other hand, the practice (as opposed to the law) of 
criminal investigation in the white collar arena affords the subject of a 
corporate criminal investigation considerable informational 
advantages. The bare existence of counsel at the investigation stage 
can restrict the government’s ability to engage in some kinds of 
surprise interrogations and other common tactics for gathering 
evidence in street crime investigations.179 
These informational advantages may cash out more in 
negotiation than in litigation. As legal scholars Kenneth Mann and, 
later, Gerard Lynch famously documented, white collar criminal 
practice includes an entire phase of quasi procedure that is virtually 
nonexistent in the prosecution of street crime.180 The charging 
decision in corporate cases usually follows a kind of negotiation or 
litigation that involves pitches from defense lawyers to prosecutors—
under circumstances in which the defense has knowledge of much of 
the prosecutor’s evidence. This process can include extensive 
meetings in which the parties discuss the facts, the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, and the nature of the offense and 
comparable prosecutions—all the same things likely to influence 
decisionmakers such as judges, jurors, and probation officers in an 
actual criminal prosecution. The process even includes informal levels 
of appeal, as defense attorneys work their way up the hierarchy in the 
prosecutor’s office. (I have heard members of the corporate criminal 
defense bar say that their practice primarily involves “conference 
room litigation.”) This system of precharge procedure amounts to an 
additional bite at the apple—though it comes first—to which street 
offenders almost never have access. 
Couple these considerations with the prosecutor’s likely 
calculation—accurate or not—that trial of a corporate crime case will 
encounter better defense advocacy, more complexity, and more 
 
 179. This advantage for the corporate offender is explained lucidly in John G. Douglass, 
Jimmy Hoffa’s Revenge: White Collar Rights Under the McDade Amendment, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 123, 129–39 (2002). 
 180. The seminal study of the strikingly different role of the white collar defense lawyer 
from the street crime lawyer in criminal investigations is KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). Mann, basing his findings on 
an interview study involving the New York bar, documented at length the special role of the 
white collar defense lawyer in gaining and controlling information. Id. at 6–8; see also 
WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 9, at 99 (discussing the early involvement of counsel and the 
importance of early skilled counsel in negotiating and staving off or reducing charges); Gerard 
E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125–29 
(1998) (describing the process of precharge quasi adjudication by federal prosecutors). 
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difficulty with a jury than the ordinary criminal case. One can see why 
prosecutors might be more apt to decline to charge in the corporate 
case, or more likely to offer an irresistible discount in plea bargaining. 
The revolving door provides further support for the hypothesis 
that superior defense resources produce selection effects. If one 
thinks that federal prosecutors are self-maximizing and that their 
utility functions include a strong desire for lucrative private sector 
work following public employment, then one might predict that they 
would manage their cases in order to produce two things: verifiable 
experience in conducting high-level, complex corporate investigations 
and prosecutions; and a perception of wisdom and balance among a 
bar that includes those who make hiring decisions and refer client 
work. The object would be to both prosecute big cases and dispose of 
cases “reasonably” in the eyes of the defense bar. 
The data again complicate matters. White collar cases, it turns 
out, plead out at essentially the same rate as all others.181 Once the 
prosecutor has decided to level charges, the white collar offender 
appears to be just as overborne by the government’s power in plea 
bargaining as anyone else—maybe more so if one thinks the 
corporate defendant would tend, for a variety of reasons, to be more 
risk averse toward imprisonment than the street offender. 
C. Charging Decisions 
Selection effects may still loom large. If some potential charges 
and penalties are whittled away in the precharging phase, then the 
white collar offender will face less pressure at the formal stage of 
pretrial proceedings or trial. The rate of guilty pleas may be 
unaffected, but the outcomes may be more favorable relative to 
 
 181. Between 2005 and 2011, about 88 percent of all federal criminal cases resulted in a 
guilty plea. White collar cases pled out at approximately the same rate, with embezzlement, 
fraud, and forgery cases pleading out at an average rate of 89 percent. See ADMIN. OFFICE, 
STATISTICAL TABLES 2005, supra note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL 
TABLES 2006, supra note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2007, supra 
note 121, at 81 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2008, supra note 121, at 82 tbl.D-
4; ADMIN. OFFICE, STATISTICAL TABLES 2009, supra note 121, at 82 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE, 
STATISTICAL TABLES 2010, supra note 121, at 83 tbl.D-4; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 69 tbl.D-4 (2012), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederal
Judiciary/2011/Dec-11/D04Dec11.pdf; see also Stephanos Bibas, White Collar Plea Bargaining 
and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 723–32 (2005) (describing the heavy 
increases in sentences and prosecutorial leverage in white collar cases from the 1990s into the 
2000s, and speculating about a possible decrease in such leverage following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not binding). 
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worst-case scenarios. The empirical difficulty is that decisions not to 
pursue cases by prosecutors who operate in the exceedingly 
discretionary arena of corporate crime enforcement are not 
measurable or even observable. All I can say is that I have heard 
defense lawyers celebrate over nonprosecution decisions for 
individual clients to such a degree that the event would seem to be 
uncommon, at least once a criminal investigation gets going in 
earnest. And of course there is the familiar complaint—particularly 
strong in the debate over the virtues and vices of independent 
counsels—that prosecutors feel compelled to level some sort of 
charge and get some sort of conviction once they have been tasked 
with a major investigation.182 
A tentative answer to the question about privilege in defense 
resources might be as follows. The most likely point of resource 
leverage for the corporate offender is at the stage of informal 
negotiation and litigation over charging decisions and, perhaps to a 
lesser extent, plea bargains. The degree of that leverage relative to 
the street offender is difficult to quantify. From one viewpoint, the 
leverage is enormous because the street defendant typically enjoys no 
assistance at all in the process by which prosecutors investigate crime 
and choose whether and what to charge. From another perspective, 
the white collar defense bar would contend that advocacy at the point 
of prosecutorial discretion is essential in white collar cases.183 The 
fuzzy boundaries in the business realm between crimes and merely 
civil violations, the bar would say, often mean that the difference 
between imprisonment and freedom is the idiosyncratic judgment of 
one or a few executive-branch officials about whether something is 
“really” a crime. 
Once again, those who perceive an unfair advantage to corporate 
criminals are raising more fundamental questions than they may 
realize. As a descriptive matter, corporate crime just is different than 
street crime in American society. As a result of both political 
 
 182. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the dangers inherent in broad prosecutorial discretion); Jerry Ross, Avoiding 
Captain Ahabs: Lessons from the Office of the Independent Counsel, 35 ADMIN. & SOC. 334, 
334–37 (2003) (noting that social and psychological factors incentivize prosecutors to close cases 
for the least cost). 
 183. See generally Lev L. Dassin & Guy Petrillo, Making Presentations to the United States 
Attorney’s Office and the Department of Justice, in DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 112, § 5 (discussing the multitude 
of factors that clients must consider when confronting potential criminal charges). 
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disagreement and genuine conceptual challenges, there is far less 
consensus in the field of economic activities than elsewhere about 
what “oughta be a crime.” That dissensus is evident in, among other 
places, ambivalence about whether the business crime defendant 
needs a special kind of legal defense, or rather does not deserve 
different treatment at all. 
The thought experiment might again be revealing: What would 
the criminal-justice system look like if one set about to remove any 
advantage the corporate criminal defendant enjoys from greater 
defense resources? Three alternatives spring to mind. One could 
massively increase funding for indigent defense. Given the costs 
presently incurred in defending corporate cases, one would have to 
break the public fisc to produce level funding. One could limit the 
amount of spending on private defense, directly or perhaps through a 
tax that would help fund indigent defense. But that would require 
amending the Constitution. Or one could try to legislate a revolution 
in the practice of white collar criminal defense by requiring the 
government to investigate such crimes behind a wall that closes off 
the defense bar from the government’s evidence and the prosecutor’s 
decisions about charging and plea offers. For maximizing information 
relevant to important decisions, that would seem to cut off the 
system’s nose to spite its face. 
CONCLUSION 
Justifying existing arrangements in the field of corporate crime 
enforcement has not been the purpose of the preceding discussion. 
The object has been to place in clear view the nature of any plausible 
claim that the American criminal-justice system privileges the 
individual corporate offender. This clarity can be produced by 
familiarity with the particulars of corporate criminal law and its 
current practice, examination of available data, and consideration of 
the forms of change that would be required to reorder the relative 
positions of corporate and street offenders. 
Sentencing law and practice no longer privilege the individual 
corporate defendant. Substantive criminal law, if anything, is less 
favorable to white collar offenders than others. Trans-substantive 
doctrines of procedure and evidence do not themselves contain 
features that white collar defendants can particularly exploit. 
Enforcement institutions, as constructed and operated, privilege the 
corporate offender only if one holds the belief that the present 
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capitalist economic system could coexist with the kind of intrusive 
policing techniques routinely applied to violent and other street 
crimes. A great advantage in defense resources is available to the 
corporate employee subject to the criminal process. That resource 
advantage likely produces some discretionary amelioration of charges 
and plea offers that is not quantifiable. But it is hard to see how one 
could level criminal cases on the dimension of defense resources 
without radically changing the American conception of rights to 
representation. 
The argument that corporate criminals are privileged, it turns 
out, originates in an external point of view on law and legal 
institutions. Critics of present treatment of corporate crime are 
implicitly advocating more fundamental and consequential changes 
than they generally acknowledge or perhaps realize. A viable 
argument about privilege would bid Americans to adopt new 
perspectives on what to call a crime, how to police economic activity 
with enforcement institutions, and how to contest suspicions and 
accusations of serious wrongdoing. 
Such contentions deserve serious responses. They have reform 
implications more profound than one would think from observing the 
recent skirmishing over corporate crime in the public square. And 
they thrust the subject of corporate crime into the fray of debate over 
America’s impulse to ask criminal law to relieve its frustrations with 
intractable regulatory problems. The foregoing discussion should help 
structure and clarify such important normative debates. 
 
